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ABSTRACT 
Does social similarity between the auditor and a specialist induce social biases that 
impair the auditor’s reliance on the specialist? It is important to examine potential impairments 
to reliance since auditors do not possess expertise in many of the areas examined during the 
audit. One type of specialist that is increasingly relied upon by the auditor is the IT specialist. 
Since firms have two approaches to the organization of IT personnel (decentralized vs. 
centralized) and often use professional designations as a hiring criteria for specialists, I examine 
two dimensions of social similarity: domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance. 
Using a 2 × 2 experiment manipulating the IT specialist’s domain knowledge distinctiveness 
(distinct vs. overlapping) and spatial distance (in-house office location vs. outsourcing from 
another office) relative to the auditor, I investigate financial auditors’ reliance on IT specialists.  
My findings provide evidence of a boundary condition to the widely accepted social 
identity theory. Specifically, when specialists (IT specialists in this study) are outsourced, 
marginally less reliance is placed on specialists possessing overlapping (shared) domain 
knowledge relative to distinct domain knowledge. Additionally, I find evidence of a “consultant 
effect” in which greater auditor reliance is placed on IT specialists from other offices when the 
IT specialist possesses distinct domain knowledge relative to the financial auditor. Findings 
suggest that a broader theory of social similarity in which dimensions of social similarity can 
interact to produce social biases appears to be more descriptive of real-world social complexities 
than social identity theory.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several decades the complexity of business environments has proliferated to 
such levels that standard setters have presumptively mandated the auditor to consider the use of 
specialists when conducting an audit of financial statements. Statement on Auditing Standard 
(SAS) No. 73, Using the Work of a Specialist, and AU-C 620, Using the Work of an Auditor’s 
Specialist provide examples of areas in which the auditor may need to seek assistance from a 
specialist when conducting the audit of public entities and non-public entities, respectively 
(AICPA 2012; AICPA 1994). For example, auditors may seek a specialist possessing expertise 
relating to areas such as the valuation of complex financial instruments, the actuarial calculation 
of liabilities associated with insurance contracts or employee benefit plans, or the estimation of 
oil and other mineral reserves.   
 One situation encountered by auditors with increasing frequency is client use of complex 
information systems. The widespread implementation of enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems, for example, by small, medium, and large companies prompted standard setters to 
presumptively require auditors to consider assigning information technology (IT) specialists to 
audit engagements in order to determine the effect of IT on the audit, gain an understanding of IT 
controls, and design and perform tests of IT controls (AICPA 2012; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). The 
escalating importance of the role of IT in the integrated audit of financial statements and internal 
controls over financial reporting for publicly traded companies has increased the value of IT 
specialists to audit firms.  
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Given the current pervasiveness of IT throughout organizations and standards’ increased 
emphasis on internal controls over financial reporting, it is important to assess the implications 
of how an audit firm organizes and coordinates its IT personnel since this type of specialist is 
being included more frequently on audit engagements. Once the decision has been made to bring 
an IT specialist onto an audit engagement for the purpose of performing controls testing, not only 
must the source and qualifications of the specialist be determined, but also how the specialist will 
interact with and be perceived by other engagement team members. 
Using social network theory and literature from the judge-advisor system paradigm, I 
conjecture a boundary condition for social identity theory (SIT), such that in certain instances 
there is a preference for the socially dissimilar. In contrast to the standard “social identity” 
construct, I examine two dimensions of a construct I term “social similarity.” The two 
dimensions of social similarity examined in the current study are 1) domain knowledge 
distinctiveness and 2) spatial distance, such that a decrease in either of these dimensions reflects 
an increase in social similarity. In the current study, domain knowledge distinctiveness is either 
distinct when the IT specialist possesses unique knowledge or overlapping when the IT specialist 
possesses both unique and shared knowledge relative to the auditor. Spatial distance between the 
auditor and the IT specialist can be either absent (same office) or present (different offices).
1
  
The degree of social similarity between the auditor and the IT specialist is expected to 
have a significant impact on the auditor’s reliance on IT specialists. Accordingly, my 
overarching research question is as follows: How do the social similarity dimensions of domain 
knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance affect financial auditors’ reliance on IT 
                                                 
1
 The absence of spatial distance is in terms of office location and does not reflect zero physical distance between 
the IT specialist and financial auditor. Thus, in the absence of spatial distance, the IT specialist and financial auditor 
are from the same engagement office. 
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specialists? It is imperative to examine the effects of these practice-relevant dimensions of social 
similarity because audit firms differ in regards to the organization and coordination of IT 
personnel as well as the type of domain knowledge possessed by IT specialists.
2
 Discussions 
with managers and partners from nine audit firms, including all of the Big Four firms as well as 
national and regional firms, reveal that firms either position their IT specialists throughout all 
offices of the firm or locate them at selected offices of the firm for assignment to audit 
engagements at other offices as needed. In terms of domain knowledge, IT specialists typically 
have knowledge in the domain of systems design and control and/or financial reporting (Hunton 
et al. 2004). Social biases induced by differences among IT personnel in terms of office location 
and domain knowledge have the potential to result in inadequate financial auditor reliance on IT 
specialists, thereby impairing audit quality by way of audit effectiveness. 
Examination of the social similarity dimension of domain knowledge distinctiveness is 
imperative because financial auditors and IT auditors have distinctive expertise structures 
(Hunton et al. 2004; Curtis and Viator 2000). While financial auditors develop expertise in 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and generally accepted auditing standards 
(GAAS), IT auditors develop expertise in the domain of systems design and controls (Brazel and 
Agoglia 2007). Typically, a financial auditor in a manager position will have a CPA (Certified 
Public Accountant) designation (Bernardi and Arnold 1997), while an IT auditor in an equivalent 
hierarchical position will hold a CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor) designation 
(Hunton et al. 2004). In some situations, financial auditors and IT auditors possess both a CPA 
designation and a CISA designation (Hunton et al. 2004).  
                                                 
2
 Similar to other organizations, audit firms make considerable investments in recruiting appropriate talent and 
providing continuing education to existing personnel. 
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The distinct types of expertise possessed by these two types of professionals is evidenced 
by research documenting differences in the knowledge, judgments, and decisions of financial 
auditors and IT auditors (Curtis et al. 2009). For example, IT auditors consider internal controls 
from different perspectives than do financial auditors (Curtis and Viator 2000; Viator and Curtis 
1998). Additionally, IT auditors are more responsive to seeded control weaknesses in enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) environments than financial auditors (Hunton et al. 2004). While IT 
auditors excel in realistically assessing risks in ERP environments, financial auditors display 
overconfidence in their own abilities in such settings (Hunton et al. 2004). Since financial 
auditors exhibit overconfidence in their own abilities with respect to assessing IT related control 
risks, it is likely that the degree of social similarity between the financial auditor and the IT 
specialist in terms of domain knowledge will impact financial auditors’ reliance on IT specialists. 
Accordingly, the first research question is as follows: How does the level of domain 
knowledge distinctiveness of the IT specialist relative to the financial auditor affect the financial 
auditor’s reliance on the controls testing performed by the IT specialist? Specifically, do 
financial auditors possessing knowledge in the domain of financial reporting (i.e., CPA) make 
differential adjustments to the audit plan in response to control risk assessments made by IT 
specialists with distinct knowledge in the domain of IT (i.e., CISA) relative to IT specialists with 
overlapping knowledge in the domain of financial reporting (i.e., CPA in addition to a CISA)? 
The other social similarity dimension examined in this study is the spatial distance 
between the financial auditor and the IT auditor in terms of office location. Typically, the Big 
Four firms and national firms maintain IT audit departments for the purposes of providing IT 
audit support and performing systems assurance services (Vendrzyk and Bagranoff 2003). 
Similar to financial auditors, the IT audit department usually exists under the broad umbrella of 
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“assurance” services (Vendrzyk and Bagranoff 2003). Although IT specialists and financial 
auditors work under the broad umbrella of “assurance services,” interviews with managers and 
partners from nine audit firms (regional, national, and all of the Big Four firms) suggest that IT 
specialists can be brought onto engagements from different locales. That is, an IT specialist can 
be brought onto an audit engagement from within the engagement team’s office, or, alternatively, 
from another office of the firm in instances in which the engagement office has already assigned 
IT specialists to other engagements or when all IT specialists are “housed” in one specific office 
within the firm. Accordingly, this study investigates whether the decision to outsource IT 
controls testing to IT specialists from other offices rather than employ IT specialists from within 
the office (hereafter termed “in-house”) has an impact on financial auditors’ reliance on these 
specialists.
3
 Spatial distance is expected to influence reliance because it has an impact on the 
proximity and frequency of interaction (i.e., the strength of the social ties) between the financial 
auditor and the IT specialist. Thus, the second research question of interest is: How does spatial 
distance between the IT specialist and the financial auditor affect the financial auditor’s reliance 
on the IT specialist? Specifically, how does the location from which IT specialists are brought 
onto an engagement affect financial auditors’ reliance on the controls testing performed by IT 
specialists? 
Financial auditors’ adjustments to the audit plan in response to IT specialists that differ in 
terms of domain knowledge distinctiveness are expected to depend on (i.e., interact with) the 
spatial distance between the financial auditor and the IT specialist, leading to this study’s final 
research question of interest: How does the level of domain knowledge distinctiveness of the IT 
                                                 
3
 In the context of this study and throughout the remainder of the text, “outsourcing” refers to acquiring labor from 
another office within the firm. 
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specialist affect the financial auditor’s reliance on the IT specialist when spatial distance between 
the financial auditor and the IT specialist changes?  
Differential adjustments to the audit plan in response to identical control risk assessments 
from specialists varying in terms of the aforementioned dimensions of social similarity (i.e., 
domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance) imply that financial auditors use 
heuristics that bias audit planning decision processes. The social biases reflected by different 
audit planning decisions indicate that financial auditors and IT specialists do not always interact 
as a cohesive team when IT specialists are included on audit engagements. 
This study employs a 2 × 2 between-participants experiment to examine financial 
auditors’ reliance on IT specialists. Participants consisted of 60 auditors. Participants’ reliance on 
the IT specialist is measured as the audit plan adjustments made in response to control risk 
assessments provided by the IT specialist. The first factor manipulated in this study is domain 
knowledge distinctiveness: whether the IT specialist has distinct domain knowledge (i.e., a 
CISA) or overlapping domain knowledge (i.e., a CISA and a CPA). The second factor 
manipulated is spatial distance: whether the IT specialist is in-house (i.e., absence of spatial 
distance) or outsourced from another office within the firm (i.e., presence of spatial distance). 
Results indicate a “consultant effect”4 such that financial auditors rely more on the 
control risk assessments made by IT specialists who are outsourced from a different office within 
the firm relative to IT specialists who are engaged from within the same office (i.e., in-house). 
This consultant effect is driven by differences in reliance on IT specialists that possess distinct 
                                                 
4
 In his book, Kinross defines a consultant as an expert in a specific field with wide knowledge of a subject matter 
who provides clients with “access to deeper levels of expertise than would be feasible for them to retain in-house” 
(2013, 5). Consequently, I use the term “consultant effect” to describe my results that reveal increased reliance on 
specialists outside the engagement office because these specialists are subconsciously perceived as consultants 
having access to deeper levels of expertise relative to specialists retained in-house. 
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domain knowledge, since IT specialists that possess overlapping domain knowledge are relied 
upon equally despite differences in spatial distance. Results also reveal a boundary condition to 
SIT. Though in-house IT specialists possessing overlapping domain knowledge (i.e., a CISA and 
a CPA) are not relied upon more than in-house IT specialists with distinct domain knowledge 
(i.e., a CISA), the pattern of results is consistent with SIT and approaches marginal significance. 
The opposite occurs when the IT specialist is outsourced. Thus, SIT is expected to hold when the 
financial auditor and IT specialist are socially similar in terms of spatial distance (i.e., in-house 
IT specialist) but not when the financial auditor and IT specialist are socially dissimilar in terms 
of spatial distance (i.e., outsourced IT specialist). I find evidence that the additional reliance on 
outsourced IT specialists with distinct domain knowledge (i.e., a CISA) over outsourced IT 
specialists with overlapping domain knowledge (i.e., a CISA and a CPA) is marginally 
significant, providing some evidence in favor of a preference for the dissimilar. Taken together, 
my findings suggest that greater social similarity in terms of domain knowledge distinctiveness 
attenuates the effect of spatial distance on the financial auditor’s reliance on an IT specialist.  
Finally, I make predictions regarding the social desirability bias exhibited by financial 
auditors in providing judgments of IT specialist competence. I predict and find that financial 
auditors assess the competence of IT specialists with overlapping domain knowledge (i.e., a 
CISA and a CPA) as higher than IT specialists with distinct domain knowledge (i.e., only a 
CISA), despite the fact that these judgments are inconsistent with actual reliance on IT 
specialists that are spatially distant. This result provides some evidence that my auditor 
participants exhibited a social desirability bias when making judgments about the IT specialist’s 
competence. Participants’ judgments reflect a social desirability bias because it is expected that 
individuals with knowledge in two domains would be assessed as possessing higher levels of 
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competence than those with knowledge in a single domain. I also predict and find that financial 
auditor’s judgments of IT specialist competence are not positively associated with the degree to 
which the financial auditor relies on the IT specialist. Additionally, I predict and find that the 
financial auditor’s level of social identification with the IT specialist suppresses the negative 
direct effect of financial auditor judgments of IT specialist competence on financial auditor’s 
actual reliance on the IT specialist.  
My findings have implications for both practice and theory. Since identical risks in 
internal controls should be responded to similarly, differences in audit planning attributable to 
the distinctiveness of the IT specialist’s domain knowledge  and to the location from which the 
IT specialist is coming indicate that financial auditors are exhibiting social biases in their 
reliance decisions, potentially impairing audit quality. Thus, while firms may have considered 
assimilating these two distinct groups of audit personnel in an effort to improve audit quality, my 
results suggest that reliance by financial auditors on IT specialists would increase most by 
housing them in unique offices rather than integrating them into the financial auditors’ offices. 
Audit engagements requiring an IT specialist can outsource IT specialists from these IT 
specialist “hubs” as needed.  
In addition to having implications for practice, this study contributes to the accounting, 
psychology, and sociology academic literatures. Foremost, this study contributes to the audit and 
accounting information systems literature by investigating pragmatically relevant factors that 
result in social biases affecting financial auditors’ reliance on IT specialists. This study also 
contributes to the social psychology literature by establishing a boundary condition to the widely 
accepted social identity theory, putting forth evidence that a theory of social similarity may be 
9 
 
more descriptive of real-world phenomena as it allows for dimensions of social similarity to 
interact in affecting behavior.
5
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature 
and theory, Section 3 discusses the hypotheses development, the method is described in Section 
4, Section 5 explains the results, Section 6 provides a discussion of supplemental analyses, 
Section 7 provides a discussion of the findings, and Section 8 presents conclusions, implications, 
limitations, and avenues for future research. 
                                                 
5
 In this paper, I build on and further develop Kanter’s (1977) theory of social similarity. In her book, Kanter 
describes the role of social similarity in easing the uncertainty faced by members of organizations that are in early 
stages of growth. Essentially, she argues that conditions of uncertainty force people to rely on others using social 
bases of trust. While Kanter discusses the role of social similarity in reducing uncertainty and improving 
communication amongst individuals at managerial levels, I examine the broader organizational implications that two 
dimensions of social similarity have on auditors’ reliance on specialists in an audit setting. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORY 
This section provides a review of relevant accounting literature and theory. In order to 
answer my research questions, this study employs the following theories to motivate testable 
hypotheses: Social Identity Theory, the Judge-Advisor System Paradigm, and Social Network 
Theory. 
2.1 Auditing Standards 
Several auditing standards provide guidance to external auditors about the factors that 
should be considered when arriving at a conclusion about whether to include IT specialists
6
 on 
the audit. Code section AU-C 300, Planning the Audit, presumptively mandates the auditor of 
non-public companies to consider the need for specialized skills, such as those possessed by IT 
specialists, in performing the audit (AICPA 2012). Additionally, Auditing Standard No. 5, An 
Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of Financial 
Statements, has enhanced the role of the IT specialist by requiring auditors of publicly traded 
companies subject to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to gain an understanding of 
IT controls and to test those controls in order to provide an opinion over the effectiveness of 
internal controls over financial reporting (PCAOB 2007). Factors for consideration included in 
these standards include the complexity of the entity’s systems and IT controls as well as the 
significance of any system changes or new implementations (AICPA 2012). Nonetheless, the 
                                                 
6
 In practice, IT specialists are referred to as IT auditors. As a result, the terms “IT specialist” and “IT auditor” are 
synonymous (Harrison 1999). 
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auditor’s decision to include IT specialists on the audit engagement team remains a matter of 
professional judgment. However, the pervasiveness of IT in the business world today makes it 
difficult for the financial auditor to justify exclusion of an IT specialist from most audits. 
Consequently, examination of this particular setting is important since the standards encourage 
the use of IT specialists on engagements in which the audit client has a complex IT environment. 
2.2 Accounting Literature 
IT specialists are being employed with increasing frequency due to the widespread 
implementation of complex information systems such as enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems by small, medium, and large companies. One of the major benefits to complex 
information systems such as ERP systems is the ability to implement automated internal controls. 
Prior literature on internal controls indicates that IT-related internal controls serve important and 
pervasive functions in organizations. For example, material IT control weaknesses are associated 
with lower financial performance (Carter et al. 2012; Boritz and Lim 2008), have a more 
pervasive negative impact on the reliability of internal controls over financial reporting (Haislip 
et al. 2011), and are associated with less accurate management forecasts (Li et al. 2012). Given 
the negative implications of inadequate or ineffective IT controls and the significant role played 
by the IT specialist in detecting problems in IT controls, it is no wonder that standard setters 
presumptively require auditors to consider assigning IT specialists to audit engagements to 
determine the effect of IT on the audit, to gain an understanding of IT controls, and to design and 
perform tests of IT controls (AICPA 2012; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). 
Curtis et al. (2009) suggest that it is advisable to involve IT auditors on audit 
engagements for client’s with highly computerized systems. Despite the important role of the IT 
auditor on many engagements, little research has examined issues pertaining to the interaction of 
12 
 
financial auditors and IT auditors (Curtis et al. 2009). There are, however, several studies that 
indirectly relate to this study.  
Research has documented evidence of auditors failing to employ IT specialists on audit 
engagements for clients with complex systems. Janvrin et al. (2008) conducted a survey of 181 
auditors representing Big Four, national, regional, and local firms. Results of the survey indicate 
that IT specialists are infrequently brought onto the audit, even when the client’s systems are 
complex.
7
 Specifically, when audit clients have high levels of IT complexity, 39 out of 50 non-
Big Four survey respondents indicated that their frequency of IT specialist use over the past year 
was low. However, Big Four firms employ IT specialists more frequently for clients high in IT 
complexity as reflected by 35 out of 40 survey respondents indicating that their frequency of IT 
specialist use over the past year was high. Since the passage of Section 404 of SOX, however, it 
has become increasingly difficult for auditors to justify exclusion of the IT specialist on most 
audit engagements due to the law’s increased emphasis on internal controls over financial 
reporting, many of which are more commonly automated in nature. 
It stands to reason that the financial auditor and the IT specialist have unique knowledge 
and experience making each better suited for certain tasks performed during the course of the 
audit. In a comparison of risk assessments made by financial auditors and IT auditors, Hunton et 
al. (2004) find that financial auditors are less likely to understand control risks of more complex 
ERP systems. Despite this lack of understanding, financial auditors appear overconfident in their 
ability to assess ERP system risks (Hunton et al. 2004). However, in complex accounting 
information system (AIS) environments, the  information system (IS) expertise of financial 
auditors appears to be significantly related to their control risk assessments made in response to 
                                                 
7
 Janvrin et al.’s (2008) study was conducted during the 2002-2003 period; however, Section 404 of SOX was not 
yet effective. 
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evidence provided by IT specialists (Brazel and Agoglia 2007). Specifically, the more IS 
expertise the financial auditor possesses, the better he/she is at adjusting the audit plan in 
response to evidence gathered by IT specialists (Brazel and Agoglia 2007). As in the Brazel and 
Agoglia (2007) study, this study examines differences in financial auditors’ planning decisions in 
response to information provided from IT specialists. Unlike Brazel and Agoglia’s (2007) 
examination of the effects of IT specialist competence and the auditor AIS expertise on audit 
planning decisions, this study examines the effects of dimensions of social similarity (i.e., 
domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance) on financial auditor planning decisions 
in an effort to capture the social biases affecting ultimate reliance by financial auditors.  
Social aspects of the relationships among audit personnel should be considered when 
conducting decision research (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). Kadous et al. (2013) conducted an 
experiment examining the effect of social bonds and advice justifiability on auditors’ willingness 
to use contrary advice. The authors find that non-specialist auditors rely on a trust heuristic such 
that they weight evidence from an advisor with a stronger social bond more heavily and without 
regard to the advice’s justification (Kadous et al. 2013). More interestingly, however, specialist 
auditors rely less on better justified advice from a stronger social bond advisor even though they 
assess the quality of such advice as higher; the authors posit that the ego-relevant nature of the 
task may have induced such defensive discounting of the advice (Kadous et al. 2013). Although 
financial auditors and IT specialists alike assess control risks and perform testing of internal 
controls, financial auditors are less likely to exhibit defensive discounting of control risk 
assessments made by IT specialists because of the weaker social bonds between the distinct IT 
and financial audit practices of the firm’s risk assurance group (Vendrzyk and Bagranoff 2003).  
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This study answers calls for research on the consequences of IT auditor interaction with 
financial auditors on the audit (Curtis et al. 2009; Hunton et al. 2004) and on the characteristics 
of social contexts that influence decision making (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). 
2.3 Preference for the Similar – Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory (SIT) is a social-psychology theory developed by Henri Tajfel 
(1978) and John Turner (1975) proposing that individuals classify themselves as well as others 
into social categories or groups based on common criteria such as age, gender, or religious 
affiliation (Ashforth and Mael 1989). The purpose of social categorization is two-fold: 1) it 
allows an individual to make sense of his/her social environment by providing a systematic 
means of distinguishing others, and 2) permits an individual to socially identify with some 
human collective or group (Ashforth and Mael 1989). This latter function of social identification 
is critical to the development of self-concept, which is comprised of both an individual’s social 
identity based on group classifications and personal identity based characteristics that distinguish 
the individual from others (Ashforth and Mael 1989). Ashforth and Mael define identification as 
“the perception of oneness with or belongingness to a group, involving direct or vicarious 
experience of its successes and failures” (1989, 34). 
2.3.1 Levels of Social Identification 
Individuals will maintain multiple social identities at different levels and based on 
entirely different factors. For example, a female Hindu external auditor will identify with the 
following three social groups: 1) women, 2) Hindus, and 3) public accountants. Organizational 
identification, like other types of social identification, allows an individual to enhance his/her 
self-esteem by permitting comparisons to be made to others outside the organization (Ashforth 
and Mael 1989). This process of intergroup comparisons enables an individual to relish the 
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successes and status of his/her organization. In large or complex organizations, however, 
individuals may also identify at department or work group levels (Ashforth and Mael 1989). 
While factors such as similarity, proximity, and shared goals are traditionally associated with 
group formation, these factors alone do not necessarily result in identification (Ashforth and 
Mael 1989). 
2.3.2 Determinants of Social Identification 
Given that individuals naturally form part of groups at different levels, SIT suggests that 
the tendency to identify with groups is a function of three factors: distinctiveness of the group’s 
values and practices relative to those of other groups, prestige of the group, and salience of the 
out-groups (Ashforth and Mael 1989).
8
 The SIT literature labels the group with which an 
individual identifies an “in-group” and labels other groups to which the individual makes relative 
comparisons “out-groups.”  
Distinctiveness of the group’s values and practices equates to the uniqueness of the group 
relative to other groups; hence, the more unique or distinct a group is, the more likely individuals 
within the group will identify with that group. As group domains and boundaries become better 
defined and increasingly impermeable, group distinctiveness will increase the tendency for group 
identification (Ashforth and Mael 1989). The second factor that increases the tendency for group 
identification, prestige of the group, relates to the notion of social identification as a mechanism 
to enhance self-esteem. The more prestigious a group, the more likely its members will identify 
with the group because identification with the group improves self-worth. Finally, increased 
salience of the out-groups is associated with a greater tendency to identify with a group. 
Specifically, as an individual’s awareness of out-group(s) increases, so does the tendency to 
                                                 
8
 The terms group identification (group identity) and social identification (social identity) are used interchangeably.  
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identify with an in-group. Thus, even if a highly prestigious group is very distinct from another 
group, identification will not occur if the highly prestigious group is unaware of the other group.  
2.3.3 Effects of Social Identification 
Group identification can occur even in situations lacking interpersonal cohesion, 
similarity, or interaction among group members and nevertheless impact behavior significantly 
(Ashforth and Mael 1989). SIT argues group identities are maintained via intergroup 
comparisons in which individuals seek positive differences between their in-groups and referent 
out-groups (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Tajfel 1978). As a result, groups will often denigrate 
reference out-groups in order to perceive or elicit greater differentiation than exists in reality 
(Ashforth and Mael 1989; Turner 1975). Furthermore, threats to a group’s domain or resources 
only exacerbate such differentiation behavior (Ashforth and Mael 1989).  
The aforementioned biases in intergroup comparisons often result in negative 
stereotyping of out-groups as well as the oversimplification and depersonalization of out-group 
members (Ashforth and Mael 1989). While the in-group perceives itself as deserving of its 
accomplishments and not of its failures, the opposite is true for the out-group; as a result, in-
group bias justifies the maintenance of social distance and behavior that belittles the out-group 
(Ashforth and Mael 1989). Furthermore, individuals perceive their in-group as more peaceful, 
trustworthy, friendly, and honest than out-groups (Brewer 1999). This perception of moral 
superiority is reinforced by the general preference for the familiar over the unfamiliar (Brewer 
1999).  
In situations of perceived interdependence and the need for cooperative action, as is the 
case when financial auditors and IT specialists work together on an audit engagement, the 
absence of mutual trust between highly differentiated social groups becomes all the more salient 
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(Brewer 1999). Further, shared experiences and cooperation between two distinct social groups 
threaten the basis for each group’s social identification, resulting in a resistance to cooperate and 
collaborate because groups want to remain distinct (Brewer 1999). One negative aspect of social 
identification is that the mere existence of another group may prevent intergroup harmony and 
collaboration (Ashforth and Mael 1989). However, a benefit of social identification is that the 
trustworthiness of other in-group members can be inferred and thereby increase intragroup 
harmony and collaboration. 
In-group favoritism occurs even when group outcomes are independent of one another; 
that is, an individual’s evaluation of the in-group’s output will be more positive compared to an 
evaluation of objectively identical output from the out-group (Brewer 1979; Ferguson and Kelley 
1964). Thus, even in the absence of competitive interdependence between groups, in-group bias 
persists as evidenced by differentiation (Brewer 1979). In fact, research provides evidence that 
competition does not initiate differentiation between groups, but rather, differentiation between 
groups generates competition (Rabbie and Wilkens 1971). Furthermore, differentiated groups or 
sub-units within an organization may acknowledge each other’s unique expertise without 
necessarily conceding positive differentiation (Ashforth and Mael 1989). 
In the context of my study, I expect that spatial distance alone will not suffice for social 
identification purposes because different offices within an audit firm lack highly distinct values 
and practices from one another. In addition to the similarity of organizational values and 
practices within the audit firm, different offices within the same firm are unlikely to differ in 
terms of prestige since the prestige of the audit firm as a whole encompasses all offices. 
However, the combination of a shared office location and shared domain knowledge can result in 
financial auditors identifying with in-house IT specialists who are CISA-CPAs more than in-
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house IT specialists who possess only a CISA designation. I expect financial auditor reliance on 
the IT specialist to be higher for IT specialists that form part of the financial auditor’s in-group 
based on two social similarity criteria: domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance. 
However, financial auditors will not exhibit this in-group bias towards in-house IT specialists 
possessing a unique single-domain professional designation (i.e., a CISA) because they only 
have office location as a shared characteristic on which to identify, resulting in lower reliance. 
This lower reliance results because in-house CISA IT specialists are viewed as out-group 
members, consistent with SIT. The next section discusses social network theory.   
2.4 The Boundary of Preference for the Similar and Dissimilar – Social Network Theory 
 Although there is a rich stream of research that supports the notion of the individual’s 
preference for the similar as put forth by SIT, I propose that there is a boundary condition to this 
theory. Though strong social ties typically result in perceptions of more useful knowledge being 
exchanged because strong social ties provide a relational benefit of implied trust, weak ties can 
provide a structural benefit of non-redundant information (Levin and Cross 2004). In particular, 
when perceived trustworthiness is high, weak social ties are a conduit for more useful knowledge 
than strong ties (Levin and Cross 2004). In the audit setting, financial auditors are expected to 
perceive IT specialists as trustworthy as they both share the same ultimate objective of providing 
assurance over the client’s financial statements and internal controls over financial reporting.9 In 
this scenario, increasing spatial distance (i.e., decreasing the strength of ties) by way of the IT 
specialist’s office location can enhance the preference for and reliance on distinct (as opposed to 
                                                 
9
 Results indicate that participants in my study assessed the IT specialist to be trustworthy as reflected by a mean 
response of 6.5 (std. dev. = 2.418) on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from “1-Not at All Trustworthy” to “10-Very 
Trustworthy.” There were no statistical differences in assessments of trustworthiness across groups (F-statistic = 
0.689, p-value = 0.562, untabulated). 
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overlapping) domain knowledge IT specialists, contrary to what would be expected under SIT, 
thereby resulting in an interaction between the two social similarity dimensions of domain 
knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance. The following subsection discusses social 
network theory and the conditions under which weak ties (i.e., increased spatial distance) 
increase the perceived usefulness of knowledge imparted by another individual. 
 Social network research has examined the importance of the strength of ties in knowledge 
acquisition. Tie strength varies on a continuum from weak, distant and infrequent interaction, to 
strong, close and frequent interaction (Levin and Cross 2004). While the trust literature provides 
extensive evidence that trusting relationships result in greater knowledge exchange, social 
network studies provide evidence demonstrating the benefits of both weak and strong ties (Levin 
and Cross 2004). One of the benefits of weak ties, in contrast to strong ties, is that they are more 
likely to provide the benefit of non-redundant (i.e., new) information (Granovetter 1973). 
Consistent with this notion, members and nonmembers of groups sometimes share stereotypes 
about their respective groups such that representatives of dissimilar groups could be perceived as 
having greater competence (Simons et al. 1970). Thus, contrary to SIT, social network theory 
predicts that there are situations in which decreased identification with a group may not result in 
denigration of that group in terms of reliance. One such situation is when spatial distance is 
increased (i.e., ties are weakened).  
While there is no question that strong ties result in the transfer of useful information, 
when perceived trustworthiness is high, weak ties frequently impart knowledge that is perceived 
as more useful than strong ties (Levin and Cross 2004). Using survey responses from three 
companies from different countries and industries, Levin and Cross (2004) find that weaker ties 
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(more so than stronger ties) lead to perceptions of the receipt of more useful knowledge when 
controlling for benevolence-based trust and competence-based trust.  
Benevolence-based trust reflects the trust that another individual will not cause 
intentional harm when given the opportunity, while competence-based trust reflects the belief 
that another individual is knowledgeable about a given subject (Levin and Cross 2004). Since IT 
specialists, whether in-house or outsourced, have little or no reason to cause intentional harm by 
providing inaccurate information to the financial auditor charged with making adjustments to the 
audit plan, benevolence-based trust is not germane to the current study. However, competence-
based trust is germane to the current study because domain knowledge is manipulated and this 
manipulation may impact perceptions of competence.   
 In the setting I examine, I propose that the IT specialist from a different office than the 
financial auditor constitutes a weak tie, while the IT specialist in the same office as the financial 
auditor constitutes a strong tie. While this study does not measure the perceived receipt of useful 
knowledge as Levin and Cross (2004) did, it does examine the financial auditor’s reliance on 
such information (i.e., perceived usefulness of the knowledge). Contrary to what would be 
predicted by SIT, I expect that financial auditors will rely on an IT specialist from another office 
more than an IT specialist from within the same office when controlling for perceptions of the IT 
specialist’s competence.  
2.5 Preference for the Dissimilar – Judge-Advisor System Paradigm 
 The majority of experimental studies in the advice-taking literature employ the Judge-
Advisor System (JAS) paradigm (Gino et al. 2009; Sniezek et al. 2004; Sniezek and Buckley 
1995). Since decision-making in an audit engagement context is a social process such that the 
work (i.e., advice) of more than one person influences judgments and decisions made throughout 
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the audit, findings from the JAS literature are relevant to this study. A JAS is composed of one or 
more persons acting as advisors that communicate judgments or recommend alternatives to an 
individual representing a judge (Sniezek and Buckley 1995). In the context of this study, the IT 
specialist is the advisor providing a control risk assessment to the financial auditor (judge) 
responsible for adjusting the audit plan in response to this control risk assessment.  
Prior studies in the JAS literature have examined two types of decision tasks performed 
by the judge: choice tasks or judgment tasks (Gino et al. 2009). Choice tasks involve selection 
from a set of alternatives, while judgment tasks involve making quantitative estimates. JAS 
studies also differ in terms of the nature of the advice provided by the advisor. Advice can be 
provided by someone who is equally informed relative to the judge or someone who possesses 
expertise (Gino et al. 2009). Advice can be offered by the advisor with the possibility of rejection 
from the judge, or advice can be provided by default (Gino et al. 2009). Similar to Gino et al. 
(2009), this study employs a judgment task, expert advisor, and advice offered to participants by 
default.  
 Using three JAS experiments, Gino et al. (2009) find that information received from a 
different advisor is weighted more heavily than information received from a similar advisor 
when judging other’s (as opposed to one’s own) actions. Unlike SIT, which emphasizes the 
preference for the similar, this study demonstrates the preference for the dissimilar in the setting 
of making a judgment about another’s actions. In the context of an audit engagement, control 
risk assessments (as well as inherent risk assessments) are made with the ultimate purpose of 
adjusting the nature, extent, and timing of audit procedures to be responsive to these risks. The 
control risk assessment is a judgment about another in the sense that the audit client is the object 
of assessment, not the financial auditor (judge). Accordingly, this study examines the differences 
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in a judge’s (i.e., financial auditor) reliance on information provided by advisors (i.e., IT 
specialists) that are similar (i.e., CISA-CPAs) relative to those that are different (i.e., CISAs) in 
the context of a situation in which the judgment is being made about another entity (i.e., the audit 
client).  
 Recall that the in-group bias described by SIT is not expected to hold when describing 
reliance on IT specialists that are outsourced from other offices. Instead, the structural benefits of 
weak ties are expected to result in increased reliance on outsourced IT specialists thereby 
trumping any in-group bias that would normally result in lower reliance of the outsourced IT 
specialist. Furthermore, given the context of this study falls within the boundary of a situation in 
which the advisor is providing an assessment about another, I expect that the financial auditor 
(judge) will respond more to advisors that are different from him/her (i.e., a CISA) relative to 
those that are similar to him/her (i.e., a CISA-CPA) because the preference for the dissimilar is 
expected to override an in-group bias when the IT specialist is spatially distant (i.e., outsourced). 
When outsourced IT specialists do not share in common the CPA professional designation with 
the financial auditor (i.e., CISA-only IT specialists), control risk assessments will be relied upon 
more by the financial auditor than the assessments of CISA-CPA IT specialists. The outsourced 
CISA-only IT specialist will be relied upon by financial auditors most because outsourced CISAs 
differ from the financial auditor on two dimensions of social similarity: domain knowledge 
distinctiveness and spatial distance. This increased reliance on spatially distant IT specialists that 
possess distinct domain knowledge relative to spatially distant IT specialists that possess 
overlapping domain knowledge likely reflects a perception that the outsourced CISA-only IT 
specialist is more of an expert or more specialized. 
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Consistent with Levin and Cross’ (2004) work evidencing the power of weak ties and 
contrary to SIT, Gino’s (2009) JAS studies suggest that the financial auditor (judge) will likely 
rely on IT specialists outsourced from another office (i.e., advisors that are dissimilar in terms of 
office location) more than in-house IT specialists (i.e., advisors that are similar in terms of office 
location). Furthermore, when outsourced IT specialists do not share the common professional 
designation of CPA with the financial auditor (i.e., IT specialists possessing only a CISA 
designation), control risk assessments will be relied upon more by financial auditor CPAs than 
the assessments of IT specialists possessing both a CISA designation and a CPA designation. 
The outsourced CISA-only IT specialist will be relied upon by financial auditors most because 
outsourced CISAs differ from the financial auditor on two dimensions of social similarity: 
domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance. This increased reliance on CISA-only IT 
specialists relative to CISA-CPA IT specialists may reflect a perception that the CISA-only IT 
specialist is more of an expert or more specialized. 
2.6 Inconsistent Judgments and Decisions 
 This section discusses some of the reasons that judgments may not translate into 
behaviors that are consistent with those judgments.  
2.6.1 Self-Report Responses 
 Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) seminal work on verbal reports of mental processes 
identifies some of the difficulties inherent in the use of self-report responses. The authors argue 
that some limitations to self-report responses may reflect inaccuracy of perceptions of the effects 
of particular stimuli on higher order responses or, alternatively, the use of implicit a priori 
theories about causal relationships instead of actual memories of a cognitive process. As a result, 
when individuals are making judgments in response to stimuli (i.e., experimental manipulations), 
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their judgments may not be consistent with their subsequent behavior, which operates at a 
subconscious level; thereby providing unreliable assessments of their higher order cognitive 
processes.  
Furthermore, when individuals are fully aware of the stimuli to which they are 
responding, they will attempt to use a priori theories of causal relationships in order to respond 
to the questions about their judgments in a manner consistent with their preconceived notions. 
This results in a social desirability bias such that responses are systematically biased towards the 
“correct” or socially acceptable response (Fisher 1993), one of the major reasons experimenters 
are so concerned with demand effects.  For example, in the context of this study, financial 
auditors will likely indicate that they do not consider office location to be an important factor for 
consideration when adjusting the audit plan in response to control risk assessments provided by 
an IT specialist. However, actual audit plans will likely reflect that this factor does indeed 
significantly affect their decisions. The reason for the misalignment between judgments and 
decisions in this instance is that participants are responding in a socially desirable manner 
because the office location of the IT auditor “should not” have any impact on their planning 
decisions. 
2.6.2 The Lack of Association between Judgments and Actual Behaviors 
 In the current study, financial auditors are likely to provide judgments preferring IT 
specialists with two professional designations (i.e., a CISA and a CPA) to those possessing only 
one professional designation (i.e., a CISA). This preference is likely to be captured in terms of 
assessments of competence. However, this socially acceptable view of more designations 
reflecting more competence than fewer designations is not expected to result in higher reliance 
on IT specialists possessing overlapping domain knowledge since reliance as a behavior is 
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partially driven by subconscious beliefs. While competence is likely to be assessed as higher for 
IT specialists that have overlapping domain knowledge with the auditor, actual reliance behavior 
in terms of changes to the scope of the audit plan is expected to be either negatively associated or 
not associated with these competence judgments. Therefore, it is important to consider the 
factors that might explain inconsistencies in or the lack of a relation between these judgments 
and actual behaviors. 
SIT suggests that an individual’s social identification with another will result in an in-
group bias relative to others with whom they do not socially identify as much. Consequently, the 
effect of judgments about IT specialist competence on reliance behavior will likely be explained 
by the extent to which financial auditors identify with the IT specialist. For example, higher 
assessments of competence that are negatively associated with or not associated with actual 
reliance behavior will be suppressed by the extent to which the financial auditor socially 
identifies with the IT specialist. That is, when the extent of financial auditor identification with 
the IT specialist is taken into account, the non-positive relation between competence judgments 
and reliance behavior may become more positive. A social identity bias will therefore likely play 
a role in combatting a social desirability bias because the more a financial auditor identifies with 
an IT specialist, the less weak the relation between competence judgments and reliance.
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3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
SIT suggests that financial auditors will exhibit an in-group bias in favor of others with 
whom they identify. As discussed earlier, social identification can occur at many different levels 
(e.g., religion, race, gender, workgroup, organization, location). Accordingly, I posit that 
financial auditors will identify more closely with members of the engagement office that are 
socially similar in terms of domain knowledge. That is, within the engagement office (i.e., when 
spatial distance is absent), financial auditors will identify with IT specialists possessing both 
CISA and CPA designations because of the shared CPA designation. When IT specialists within 
the engagement team’s office possess only a CISA designation, they will be perceived by 
financial auditors to be members of an out-group.  
Based on prior research on social cognition, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) find that social 
behavior such as social identification often operates in a subconscious fashion. Since financial 
auditor self-reports of their reliance are expected to operate at a conscious level whereby a priori 
beliefs about causal relations are employed, I use financial auditors’ actual reliance decisions to 
measure the effect of subconscious social identification on behavior. Accordingly, financial 
auditors are expected to make audit plan adjustments that are more responsive to control risk 
assessments made by members of their in-groups (i.e., CISA-CPAs from their office) relative to 
control risk assessments performed by members of an out-group (i.e., CISAs from their office). 
Since financial auditors are socially similar to the CISA-CPA IT specialist in terms of 
both spatial distance (i.e., in-house) and domain-knowledge distinctiveness (i.e., overlapping 
domain knowledge), it is expected that financial auditors will rely less on in-house CISA IT 
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specialists because they are less socially similar in terms of domain knowledge distinctiveness, 
although at the same location. When the IT specialist is not spatially distant, social identification 
with the IT specialist that is more socially similar due to overlapping domain knowledge relative 
to the financial auditor (i.e., the IT specialist that is also a CPA) is expected to result in greater 
reliance. 
H1: In the absence of spatial distance relative to the IT specialist, financial auditors place 
greater reliance on IT specialists possessing overlapping domain knowledge than IT 
specialists possessing distinct domain knowledge. 
Given that the spatial distance of the IT specialist relative to the financial auditor can 
differ depending on whether the IT specialist is in-house or outsourced from another office, my 
next hypothesis specifically relates to the audit plan adjustments of the financial auditor in 
response to an IT specialist that is socially dissimilar in terms of spatial distance (i.e., from a 
different office) relative to one that is socially similar in terms of spatial distance (i.e., from the 
same office). Both Gino’s (2009) JAS studies and Levin and Cross’ (2004) social network study 
suggest the possibility that IT specialists from another office will be relied upon more by the 
financial auditor than IT specialists from the financial auditor’s office.  
As previously discussed, JAS studies conducted by Gino et al. (2009) find that 
information from a different advisor is weighted more heavily than information provided by a 
similar advisor under conditions in which another’s actions are being evaluated. Since the object 
of assessment is the audit client (an entity external to the judge), I expect, consistent with Gino et 
al. (2009), that control risk assessments made by an IT specialist from another office will be 
relied upon more than those made by an IT specialist from the same office, regardless of whether 
the IT specialist possesses distinct or overlapping domain knowledge. Furthermore, this 
prediction is consistent with Levin and Cross’ (2004) finding such that weak ties (i.e., different 
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office) will induce greater reliance than strong ties (i.e., same office). Although social identity 
theory would suggest that reliance would be higher for IT specialists that are socially similar in 
terms of spatial distance (i.e., in-house), a preference for the dissimilar is expected to override 
social identification because the presence of spatial distance (i.e., different office) impairs the 
financial auditor’s ability to socially identify with an outsourced IT specialist and because 
financial auditors subconsciously believe that individuals from other offices are so socially 
dissimilar that they have unique knowledge. Social dissimilarity in terms of spatial distance will 
result in perceptions of more unique knowledge because individuals that are farther away are 
perceived to be more likely to possess non-redundant information relative to those that are 
proximal. I term this preference for the spatially distant IT specialist a “consultant effect.” My 
predicted “consultant effect” is hypothesized as follows: 
H2: Financial auditors rely more on spatially distant IT specialists within the firm than IT 
specialists that are not spatially distant.  
 Following up on the notion that a judge will rely more on information from different 
advisors than similar advisors (Gino et al. 2009), IT specialists from another office are expected 
to be relied upon more when they possess only a CISA designation relative to when they possess 
both CISA and CPA designations. When the IT specialist is spatially distant, the preference for 
the dissimilar CISA IT specialist is expected to trump any social identification with the CISA-
CPA IT specialist resulting from a shared CPA designation.  
H3: When the IT specialist is spatially distant relative to the financial auditor, financial 
auditors will rely more on the IT specialists possessing distinct domain knowledge than 
IT specialists possessing overlapping domain knowledge.  
As previously discussed, social behavior often operates in a subconscious fashion 
(Greenwald and Banaji 1995). As a result, conscious financial auditor assessments of IT 
specialist competence that are based on the characteristics manipulated in this study (i.e., domain 
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knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance) are expected to differ from the actual reliance 
decisions made by the financial auditor. Self-reports regarding perceptions of IT specialist 
competence may reflect participants’ lack of insight into their judgment process (Bonner 2008) 
or their desire to provide responses that are “politically correct.” Contrary to my reliance 
hypothesis above (H3), I expect financial auditors will make higher assessments of competence 
for overlapping domain knowledge IT specialists (CISA-CPAs) than distinct domain knowledge 
IT specialists (CISAs). This is because individuals believe that more education (or more 
professional designations) serves to develop competence (Schultz 1960). However, at a 
subconscious level, individuals may exhibit biases in their actual behavior (i.e., reliance 
decisions as hypothesized in H2 and H3) that indicate they don’t truly maintain these conscious 
beliefs about IT specialist competence. 
Unlike actual decisions, financial auditors are expected to make socially desirable 
judgments about the IT specialist. Despite making audit plan decisions consistent with the 
aforementioned hypotheses, financial auditors’ are expected to perceive IT specialist competence 
as uniformly higher when they possess overlapping domain knowledge because that reflects 
knowledge in two distinct domains. Consequently, the competence judgment about an IT 
specialist with two professional designations (i.e., a CISA and a CPA) is expected to be higher 
than the competence judgment about an IT specialist with only one professional designation (i.e., 
a CISA).   
H4a: Financial auditors’ assessments of competence will be higher for IT specialists 
possessing overlapping domain knowledge than for IT specialists possessing distinct 
domain knowledge. 
H4b: Financial auditors’ assessments of IT specialist competence will not be positively 
associated with actual reliance on the IT specialist. 
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Social identification with the IT specialist is likely to play an important role in explaining 
the absence of a positive relation between competence judgments and reliance decisions as 
predicted in H4b. I hypothesize that the extent of identification with the IT specialist will 
suppress inconsistencies between judgments about competence and subconscious reliance 
decisions. A negative direct effect of competence judgments on the extent of reliance is expected 
to be suppressed by a positive indirect effect of financial auditor identification with the IT 
specialist, thus resulting in no overall effect (or a less negative effect) of competence judgments 
on reliance.  
H5: Inconsistencies in financial auditor judgments of IT specialist competence and 
financial auditor reliance decisions will be suppressed by the extent of financial auditor 
identification with the IT specialist. 
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4. METHOD 
4.1 Participants 
Participants in my study were auditors from a cross-section of firms that included Big 4, 
national and regional firms. Appropriate participants for my study are audit seniors or managers 
that are involved in making audit planning decisions (Houston 1999). Since auditors typically 
ascend to the senior staff level after acquiring two years of experience, appropriate participants 
for my study are auditors with at least two years of experience.
10
 Managers and partners that 
serve in an advisory capacity for the School of Accountancy at a large southeastern university 
recruited auditors in the Tampa Bay area on my behalf by forwarding an email in which I 
provided information regarding the study as well as a link to access the online study for 
participation.  
Participants ranged in seniority from staff level to partner and either have a CPA 
designation or plan on acquiring a CPA designation. Data collection took place during the Fall of 
2013. In order to ensure the validity of the data, I include data for auditor participants that 
completed the study in no more than two hours.
11
 Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for the sixty auditors that form part of my sample based on the aforementioned 
                                                 
10
 Only three participants had less than two years of auditing experience.  
11
 In some cases, auditor participants took several days to complete the online survey. A total of 127 auditors took 
part in my study. Sixty-six participants completed the online study and the remaining 59 started the study but never 
completed it. Six participants that completed the study took longer than two hours to complete the study and are 
therefore precluded from the final sample of participants. Finally, two participants took a paper and pencil version of 
the study at a CPE conference. 
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criterion. On average participants took 35.46 minutes (std. dev. = 21.86 minutes) to complete the 
study (untabulated).
12
 
Twenty-one (35 percent) of the auditor participants are female. Forty-eight (80 percent) 
auditor participants are CPAs with the remainder planning on acquiring the CPA designation 
within two years. Approximately 83 percent of the auditor participants hold the positions of 
senior auditors, managers, or senior managers, making my sample appropriate given these levels 
of auditors are most often involved in audit planning in practice. My sample reflects a suitable 
cross-section of firms with 25 (41.7 percent) Big Four auditors, 27 (45 percent) auditors from 
national firms, and 7 auditors from regional, local, and other firms. None of these frequencies 
differ statistically across conditions (see Panel A of Table 1). 
The average age of participants in the study ranged from 22 to 58 years, with a mean 
(standard deviation) of 33.6 years (9.04 years). Participants had a mean (standard deviation) of 
auditing experience of 8.5 years (8.24 years), controls testing experience of 7.2 years (8.17 
years), and audit planning experience of 7.59 years (8.42 years). None of these demographic 
variables differ statistically across conditions (see Panel B of Table 1).  
Assessments of motivation, experiment difficulty, case realism, and attentiveness were 
made by participants in the post-experimental questionnaire using a 9-point Likert scale. 
Motivation ranged from “1-Very Low” to “9-Very High,” difficulty ranged from “1-Very 
Difficult” to “9-Very Easy,” case realism ranged from “1-Very Unrealistic” to “9-Very 
Realistic,” and attentiveness ranged from “1-Not at All Attentive” to “9-Very Attentive.” 
Participants’ assessments of motivation (overall mean = 5.70, std. dev. = 1.750), experiment 
difficulty (overall mean = 5.08, std. dev. = 1.710), case realism (overall mean = 5.60, std. dev. =  
                                                 
12
 This average time does not include two participants that took a paper and pencil version of the survey at a CPE 
conference because there was no way to record the amount of time these participants spent on the survey. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:
Spatial Distance: χ²-statistic
Domain Knowledge: Distinct Overlapping Distinct Overlapping (p -value)
Gender Female 5 (31.2%) 3 (20.0%) 4 (28.6%) 9 (60.0%) 21 (35.0%) 5.958
Male 11 (68.8%) 12 (80.0%) 10 (71.4%) 6 (40.0%) 39 (65.0%) (0.114)   
Total 16 ( 100%) 15 ( 100%) 14 ( 100%) 15 ( 100%) 60 ( 100%)
CPA Yes 13 (81.2%) 10 (66.7%) 12 (85.7%) 13 (86.7%) 48 (80.0%) 2.385
Pursuing 3 (18.8%) 5 (33.3%) 2 ( 14.3%) 2 (13.3%) 12 (20.0%) (0.496)   
Total 16 ( 100%) 15 ( 100%) 14 ( 100%) 15 ( 100%) 60 ( 100%)
Position Staff Auditor 1 (  6.3%) 2 (13.3%) 1 (  7.1%) 3 (20.0%) 7 (11.7%) 11.338
Senior 7 (43.8%) 6 (40.0%) 3 (21.4%) 7 (46.7%) 23 (38.3%) (0.728)   
Manager 4 (25.0%) 4 (26.7%) 6 (42.9%) 1 (  6.7%) 15 (25.0%)
Sr. Manager 2 (12.5%) 0 (  0.0%) 2 (14.3%) 2 (13.3%) 12 (20.0%)
Partner 2 (12.5%) 2 (13.3%) 1 ( 7.1%) 2 (13.3%) 7 (11.7%)
Other 0 (  0.0%) 1 (  6.7%) 1 ( 7.1%) 0 (  0.0%) 2 (  3.3%)
Total 16 ( 100%) 15 ( 100%) 14 ( 100%) 15 ( 100%) 60 ( 100%)
Firm Size Big Four 6 (37.5%) 5 (33.3%) 8 (57.1%) 6 (40.0%) 25 (41.7%) 14.184
National 5 (31.3%) 8 (53.3%) 5 (35.7%) 9 (60.0%) 27 (45.0%) (0.289)   
Regional 4 (25.0%) 1 (  6.7%) 1 (  7.1%) 0 (  0.0%) 6 (10.0%)
Local/Small 1 (  6.3%) 0 (  0.0%) 0 (  0.0%) 0 (  0.0%) 1 (  1.7%)
Other 0 (  0.0%) 1 (  6.7%) 0 (  0.0%) 0 (  0.0%) 1 (  1.7%)
Total 16 ( 100%) 15 ( 100%) 14 ( 100%) 15 ( 100%) 60 ( 100%)
Panel B:
Spatial Distance: F -statistic
Domain Knowledge: Distinct Overlapping Distinct Overlapping (p -value)
n = 16 n = 15 n = 14 n = 15 n = 60
Age Mean 32.06 34.53 33.07 34.73 33.58 0.291
(years) Std. dev. 8.14 8.67 10.53 9.49 9.04 (0.832)   
Min 25 25 22 25 22
Max 58 54 57 58 58
Extern. Audit Mean 8.82 8.50 7.96 8.50 8.46 0.026
Experience Std. dev. 8.41 8.48 8.06 8.84 8.24 (0.994)   
(years) Min 2.08 0.75 0.33 0.67 0.33
Max 35.58 28.67 33.00 35.00 35.58
Controls Test Mean 7.64 6.58 6.94 7.70 7.23 0.064
Experience Std. dev. 8.74 7.19 7.95 9.40 8.17 (0.979)   
(years) Min 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00
Max 35.58 28.67 33.00 35.00 35.58
Planning Mean 7.72 7.78 6.95 7.85 7.59 0.034
Experience Std. dev. 8.68 8.71 8.29 8.81 8.42 (0.992)   
(years) Min 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00
Max 35.58 28.67 33.00 35.00 35.58
Absent (In-House) Present (Outsourced)
Overall
Present (Outsourced)
Overall
Absent (In-House)
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2.157), and attentiveness (overall mean = 6.18, std. dev. = 1.790) do not differ statistically across 
conditions (untabulated). 
4.2 Experimental Procedures 
In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, I employ a 2 x 2 between-participants 
experimental design. The experiment was an online experiment conducted during the Fall of 
2013. The online experiment was administered through Qualtrics, a web-based survey platform. 
The first factor, spatial distance of the IT specialist relative to the financial auditor, is 
manipulated as 1) absent (i.e., Tampa office) or 2) present (i.e., Houston office). The second  
factor, domain knowledge distinctiveness is also manipulated at two levels: 1) distinct (i.e., 
CISA only) and 2) overlapping (i.e., CISA-CPA). Professional designations are used as a proxy 
for domain knowledge because the CPA designation reflects knowledge in the area of financial 
accounting, while the CISA reflects knowledge in the area of systems design and controls. This 
proxy is appropriate since mean assessments of IT specialist expertise in financial statement 
auditing are higher (F-statistic = 7.925, p-value = 0.007, untabulated) for CISA-CPA IT 
specialists (mean = 3.57, std.dev. = 1.612) than for CISA-only IT specialists (mean = 2.47, std. 
dev. = 1.408). Yet, there are no statistically significant differences in perceptions of CISA vs. 
CISA-CPA IT specialists’ expertise in performing IT Control Risk Assessments (F-statistic = 
0.060, p-value = 0.808, untabulated). 
After reading the informed consent and agreeing to the terms of the informed consent by 
clicking on the continue button at the bottom of the page, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the four experimental conditions (see Figure 1). In an effort to avoid any potential order-
effects of describing the IT specialist, D.J. Richards, as possessing both a CISA and a CPA (in 
that order), within the overlapping domain knowledge conditions, participants were randomly 
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assigned to one of two orders: 1) CISA-CPA, and 2) CPA-CISA. The experimental instrument is 
included in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Experimental Design 
Consistent with Joe Brazel’s (2004) dissertation instrument, case materials were provided 
to participants presenting information relating to a hypothetical client (including financial 
statements and materiality calculations) and relevant authoritative audit guidance from Audit 
Standard No. 8 (AS No. 8) in regards to the audit risk model (a tool used to aid auditors in audit 
planning). The case materials indicated to participants that the company’s financial statements 
and materiality calculations could be examined at any time.
14
 The case materials directed 
participants to assume the role of a senior manager assigned to the December 31, 2012 fiscal 
year-end of the audit of the hypothetical company. Participants were also told, “You have 
worked for the Tampa office of your firm for 7 years and acquired your CPA (Certified Public 
Accountant) designation after being with the firm for 3 years.” This information was provided 
                                                 
13
 The two participants that completed paper versions of the instrument were provided the following: 1) A packet of 
the demographic questionnaire, case materials, and dependent variable questions; 2) Two manila files containing the 
financial statement/materiality calculations and control testing/risk assessment workpaper; 3) An envelope labeled 
Part 1 in which to place packet 1) once the dependent variables questions were completed; and 4) An envelope 
labeled Part 2 that contained the post-experimental questionnaire. Directions indicated that participants should not 
refer back to materials placed in the Part 1 envelope when completing the post-experimental questionnaire.  
14
 The company’s financial statements, materiality calculations, and AS No. 8 guidance could be accessed via 
hyperlinks throughout the duration of the study. The company’s financial statements and materiality calculations 
were adapted, with permission, from Joe Brazel’s (2004) dissertation at Drexel University. A paper drawn from this 
dissertation was later published in Contemporary Accounting Research (Brazel and Agoglia 2007). 
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to place the auditors in the role of an auditor working in the Tampa engagement office and to 
increase the salience of the manipulations about the IT specialist, D.J. Richards, later on in the 
experiment.  
After reading the background information on the hypothetical company, participants were 
informed that they had assessed inherent risk at the same level as last year (35 percent) and that 
they would be receiving working papers from D.J. Richards, the IT specialist responsible for 
preparing the control testing and risk assessment workpaper. At this point, participants were 
exposed to the experimental manipulations. Participants in the conditions in which the IT 
specialist was not spatially distant saw the following:  
D.J. Richards is an IT specialist who has worked in your office (the Tampa office) of 
your firm for 6 years and has performed tests of controls on similar audit engagements in 
the past. D.J. Richards possesses (BOTH of) the following professional designation(s), 
which he acquired after being with the firm for 3 years: 
 CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor) 
and 
 CPA (Certified Public Accountant) 
Participants in the conditions in which spatial distance between the IT specialist and the 
financial auditor was manipulated as present saw the following: 
D.J. Richards is an IT specialist who has worked in another office (the Houston office) 
of your firm. The only reason an IT specialist is being brought onto the engagement from 
another office is because your office’s IT specialists are all currently assigned to other 
engagements. D.J. Richards has worked for your firm for 6 years and has performed tests 
of controls on similar audit engagements in the past. D.J. Richards possesses (BOTH of) 
the following professional designation(s), which he acquired after being with the firm for 
3 years: 
 CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor) 
and 
 CPA (Certified Public Accountant) 
 
Italicized terms above (and henceforth) refer to the manipulations of domain knowledge 
distinctiveness, with distinct domain knowledge manipulated as CISA and overlapping domain 
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knowledge manipulated as CISA and CPA. As previously mentioned, the order of presentation 
of the two designations was counterbalanced. In order to ensure that the presence of spatial 
distance represented only the physical distance between the offices and not higher caliber 
personnel at the other office, the background case materials earlier described the audit firm as 
having its “national office (headquarters)” in New York. Additionally, the manipulation 
emphasizes that the “only reason an IT specialist is being brought onto the engagement from 
another office is because your office’s IT specialists are all currently assigned to other 
engagements.” This added wording ensures that the social similarity construct of spatial distance 
is the only thing being manipulated. In effect, these case facts bias against finding results by 
ensuring that participants know that the IT specialist was not brought onto the engagement from 
another office due to a lack of expertise within the engagement office. 
At this point, participants were provided access to a hyperlink to a popup window with 
the Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper prepared by D.J. Richards that 
corresponded to their randomly assigned condition. Instructions on the screen prompted 
participants to read the workpaper, indicating that controls were tested by the participant last 
year, with the initials “YOU” corresponding to their initials, and that controls were tested by D.J. 
Richards this year, with the initials “DJR” corresponding to his work. To ensure that participants 
actually opened the workpaper prior to providing judgments about the IT specialist and making 
audit plan adjustments in response to the control risk assessments made by the IT specialist, 
participants were instructed to enter into a textbox the workpaper number that was located at the 
top right-hand side of the workpaper. Participants could not proceed further until the correct 
workpaper number was entered into the textbox.  
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The workpaper provided to the participant was structured in such a manner to ensure that 
the manipulations remained salient throughout the audit planning decision task. In order to 
ensure the manipulations remained salient, the workpaper was included in a memo. The memo 
was addressed as follows: 
To:  YOU, CPA (Cert. Public Accountant), Tampa Office 
From:  DJR, CISA (Cert. Information Systems Auditor), Tampa Office 
          CPA (Cert. Public Accountant) 
Re:  Control Risk Assessment Workpaper 
The workpaper found within the memo included control risk assessments from both the 
prior year and the current year for each of eight sales and collection cycle controls that were 
tested as well as the overall control risk assessment for the sales and collection cycle from both 
the prior year and the current year. The closing at the end of the memo included state symbols of 
the IT specialist’s office location to ensure the salience of the IT specialist’s office location; this 
graphic manipulation was effective as reflected by a 95 percent manipulation check pass rate (see 
Section 4.3). The closing at the end of the memo read as follows: 
Thank you, 
D.J. Richards 
D.J. Richards, CISA (Cert. Information Systems Auditor), Tampa Office 
            CPA (Cert. Public Accountant) 
or 
 
Thank you, 
D.J. Richards 
D.J. Richards, CISA (Cert. Information Systems Auditor), Houston Office 
              CPA (Cert. Public Accountant)  
After reading the workpaper and moving forward in the online experiment, participants 
were asked to respond to questions about the strength, accuracy, reliability, source credibility, 
and trustworthiness of D.J. Richards and his related control testing and risk assessment 
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workpaper. These judgment assessments serve as judgments of the IT specialist’s overall 
credibility. Furthermore, I captured participants’ perceptions of the level of expertise possessed 
by D.J. Richards in terms of IT Control Risk Assessment and, separately, Financial Statement 
Auditing. 
In practice, auditors have access to appropriate audit guidance when working on audit 
engagements. Prior to moving to the audit planning decision task, participants were provided the 
option to review AS No. 8 guidance with regard to the Audit Risk Model by accessing the 
summary of AS No. 8 through a hyperlink. If participants accidentally closed the IT specialist’s 
workpaper or the Financial Statements and Materiality Calculations, they were also provided 
hyperlinks to access these documents during the audit planning task. 
The audit planning decision task required participants to make adjustments to the audit 
plan from last year.
15
 Participants could delete audit procedures or, alternatively, repeat or 
change the prior year’s audit procedures based on the following characteristics for each audit 
procedure: staffing (staff auditor, senior, or manager), timing of the procedure (interim or final), 
and extent of procedures (budgeted hours); these measures are consistent with those used by 
Brazel and Agoglia (2007). Participants could also add audit procedures and indicate the staffing, 
timing, and extent of such procedures (Brazel and Agoglia 2007). 
After completing the audit planning task, participants are asked to close the Control 
Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper window. Once they check the box that says, “I have 
closed the window containing the “Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper,” 
participants were permitted to proceed to the rest of the questionnaire. The first questions 
answered by participants subsequent to the audit planning task were the manipulation check 
                                                 
15
 This task was taken, with permission, from Joe Brazel’s (2004) dissertation at Drexel University. A paper drawn 
from this dissertation was later published in Contemporary Accounting Research (Brazel and Agoglia 2007).  
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questions. After answering the manipulation check questions, participants proceeded on to the 
post-experimental questionnaire. 
4.3 Manipulation Checks 
 In order to determine whether participants were sensitive to the manipulations in my 
study, I included two manipulation check questions in the post-experimental questionnaire right 
after the audit planning decision task. Fifty-seven participants (95 percent) answered the spatial 
distance (i.e., office location) manipulation check question correctly and 51 participants (85 
percent) answered the domain knowledge distinctiveness (i.e., professional designation) 
manipulation check question correctly (untabulated).  
 The frequency of manipulation check failures across conditions was nonsignificant for 
both the spatial distance manipulation check question (Pearson χ2 = 3.772; asymp. p-value = 
0.287, untabulated) and the domain knowledge distinctiveness manipulation check question 
(Pearson χ2 = 1.181; asymp. p-value = 0.758, untabulated). These results indicate that the data 
collected from the auditor participants in my study are of good quality. 
4.4 Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
The first set of questions in the post-experimental questionnaire was composed of 
assessments of D.J. Richard’s competence, the strength of the controls listed in the workpaper, 
the overall conclusion about the reliability of controls, participant confidence in the audit plan 
decisions made, and how costly the participant believed it was to employ D.J. Richards relative 
to the average staff auditor. I measure perceptions of cost because a potential explanation of 
increased reliance on and/or perception of competence for IT specialists from a different office 
location may be attributed to a paid-advice effect (Gino 2008; Arkes and Blumer 1985). This 
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effect, consistent with the sunk cost fallacy (Arkes and Blumer 1985), suggests that financial 
auditors may assume that the IT specialist should be relied upon more because the audit 
engagement has already incurred the cost of bringing this individual in from another office.  
While financial auditors are expected to rely on IT specialists that are more dissimilar in 
terms of spatial distance (i.e., from a different office), this effect may be attributed to perceptions 
of the cost of advice from these specialists. For example, if an IT specialist is being brought onto 
an engagement from a geographically distant office in the audit firm, engagement team members 
may perceive a higher cost associated with employing that individual than an in-house IT 
specialist. Consistent with this notion, Gino (2008) finds that individuals are significantly more 
receptive to advice that costs money compared to free advice. This paid-advice effect appears to 
be attributed to the same forces that have been documented in prior studies illustrating the sunk 
cost fallacy—justifying the cost of advice by using the received information to avoid regret of 
spending money on the advice (Gino 2008; Arkes and Blumer 1985).  
The post-experimental questionnaire also included assessments of participants’ 
identification with D.J. Richards, participants’ perceptions of the impact of the IT specialist’s 
office location and professional designation(s) on audit plan adjustments, participants’ 
perceptions of the impact of the financial statements on audit planning, and participants’ 
perceptions of the impact of office location and professional designation(s) on competence 
assessments of the IT specialist.  
Next participants were reminded of the experimental manipulations to which they were 
exposed and again asked questions about the strength, accuracy, reliability, source credibility, 
and trustworthiness of D.J. Richards. Once again, I also captured assessments of the participant’s 
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perception of the level of expertise possessed by D.J. Richards in terms of performing IT Control 
Risk Assessments and, separately, Financial Statement Auditing. 
Subsequently, participants indicated their agreement with statements meant to capture 
their perceptions of the exclusivity of the CPA profession and perceptions about the value (or 
lack thereof) of additional designations. Participants were then asked to describe the type of 
auditor they are on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “1-Financial Auditor” to “5-IT Auditor,” 
the extent to which the participants’ actual audit engagements utilize IT specialists from other 
offices outside the engagement office, the primary reason for bringing in IT specialists from 
other offices, and the level of the participants’ expertise with accounting information systems 
relative to other auditors at their firm. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their level of 
motivation in completing the study, perceptions of experiment difficulty, perceptions of case 
realism, and attentiveness while participating in the experiment. 
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5. RESULTS 
  
Figure 2 illustrates the specific pattern of cell means for extent of reliance on the IT 
specialist predicted by H1, H2, and H3, collectively. The level of acceptable risk of Type I error 
(i.e., level at which I consider results significant) employed throughout my dissertation is α = 
0.05. For a summary overview of results of hypotheses tests, see Figure 12). 
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Figure 2: Predicated Pattern of Means Predicted by H1, H2, and H3 
5.1 Reliance Dependent Variable 
 In order to capture the financial auditor’s degree of reliance on the IT specialist, I use the 
financial auditor’s planning decisions to create a variable I term “quality budget hours.” Since 
the participants in my study make decisions related to staffing, timing, and budgeted hours of 
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various audit procedures, I first coded each of the first two variables (staffing and timing) as 
ordinal variables. Staff auditors are assigned a value of 1 since they correspond to the lowest 
level of audit staff, seniors are assigned a value of 2 since they are the next level up in the staff 
hierarchy, and managers are assigned a value of 3 since they are the highest level that would 
perform substantive audit testing. Because audit procedures performed at interim are less reliable 
than those that are performed at year-end (i.e., final), procedures scheduled to be performed at 
interim are assigned a value of 1, while year-end procedures are assigned a value of 2. Total 
quality budget hours per audit procedure is then calculated as the product of staffing (1, 2, or 3), 
timing (1 or 2), and number of budgeted hours. The total quality budget hours for all audit 
procedures is then aggregated to proxy for the extent of financial auditor reliance on the IT 
specialist. Had participants in the study made no changes to the prior year audit plan, total 
quality budget hours would sum to 108 hours.  
 Planned quality budget hours satisfy assumptions of homogeneity of variance across 
treatments (Levene’s Test, F-statistic = 2.253, p-value = 0.092). Additionally, Shapiro-Wilk’s 
tests of the assumption of normality indicate the planned quality budget hours variable is 
normally distributed across two conditions. The two conditions in which the normality 
assumption is not satisfied are both in-house conditions (p-value < 0.009). However, ANCOVA is 
robust to slight violations of these assumptions due to the near balanced nature of my cell sizes 
(Hair et al. 2010).  
5.1.1 Effect of Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness and Spatial Distance on Reliance 
Figure 3 depicts the estimated marginal means of quality budget hours planned for by 
auditors in my study by condition. The estimated marginal means of this dependent variable 
measure of reliance appear to follow the same pattern as the predicted pattern depicted in Figure 
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2. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the quality budget hour dependent variable measure 
by condition (Panel A) and an ANCOVA testing differences among the conditions on this 
measure (Panel B).
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Figure 3: Planned Quality Budget Hours 
 
The ANCOVA model used to test H1, H2, and H3 is found in Panel B of Table 2 and 
includes the total number of months of audit planning experience and perceived IT specialist 
competence as covariates (Global F-statistic = 4.111, p-value = 0.003). Recall that Levin and 
Cross (2004) suggest that weak ties are more powerful than strong ties when controlling for  
                                                 
16
 Levene’s test of equality of error variances on the simple ANOVA indicate that the quality of budget hours 
dependent variable satisfies the assumption of homogeneity of variance (F-statistic = 2.253, p-value = 0.092, 
untabulated). However, this assumption is not satisfied for the ANCOVA model that includes number of months of 
planning experience and perceived IT specialist competence as covariates in the model (F-statistic = 3.427, p-value 
= 0.023, untabulated). Covariates included in the model are uncorrelated with and do not interact with the 
independent variables, satisfying conditions for an effective ANCOVA. To address the heteroscedasticity issue, I 
estimate a non-parametric rank regression in which the planned quality budget hours variable is ranked.  Results of 
the non-parametric test are qualitatively similar to the ANCOVA results found in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Effect of Spatial Distance & Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness on Planned 
Quality Budget Hours 
Panel A: Planned Quality Budget Hours, Estimated Marginal Mean (Standard Error)
Cell 1 Cell 3
Cell 2 Cell 4
Panel B: ANCOVA  Model of Planned Quality Budget Hours
Type III SS df F -statistic p -value
Model 190094.867 5 4.111 0.003
Spatial Distance (H2) 31829.018 1 3.441 0.069
Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness 497.499 1 0.054 0.817
Spatial Distance × Domain Knowledge Dist. (H1&H3) 8220.092 1 4.132 0.047
  Audit Planning Experience 98638.948 1 10.665 0.002
  IT Specialist Competence 27422.047 1 2.965 0.091
Error 499455.133 54
R² = 0.276; Adjusted R ² = 0.209
Panel C: Pairwise Comparisons
Comparisons (EMM Diff. [Std. Error]) Hypothesis
Cell 1 vs. Cell 2                   (-44.69 [34.824]) H1 0.205
(Cells 3+4)/2 vs. (Cells 1+2)/2  ( 46.52 [25.079]) H2 0.069
Cell 3 vs. Cell 4                    ( 56.47 [36.267]) H3 0.125
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Sources of Variation
The dependent variable "planned quality budget hours" is a proxy for degree of reliance on the IT specialist. It is calculated as the 
aggregate of the products of staffing, timing, and budgeted hours for each procedure for the sales and collection cycle. Staffing is an 
ordinal variable capturing the experience of the staff performing the procedure (1 = staff auditor, 2 = senior, 3 = manager). Timing is also 
an ordinal variable capturing the reliability of a procedure performed either at interim (1) or at year-end (2).
n = 30
188.356 234.88
(17.36)
n = 29
211.62
(12.43)
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(17.95)
p -value*95% Conf. Interval
-114.51,   25.13
-16.24, 129.18
214.56
(17.78)
n = 30
208.67
(17.75)
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n = 31
Covariates included in the model are the total number of months of audit planning experience and perceived IT specialist competence 
(measured on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from "1-Very Low" to "11-Very High."
* The p -value in Panel C is the two-tailed p -value based on Least Significant Difference.
n = 15
-3.76,   96.81
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competence-based trust; consequently, inclusion of perceived IT specialist competence in the 
model is warranted. The ANCOVA model detects a marginally significant main effect of spatial 
distance (F-statistic = 3.441; p-value = 0.069). Additionally, the model detects a statistically 
significant interaction between spatial distance and domain knowledge distinctiveness (F-
statistic = 4.132; p-value = 0.047), providing preliminary support for H1 and H3 because the 
estimated marginal means tabulated in Panel A of Table 2 are directionally consistent with both 
H1 and H3.
17
  
H1 predicts that financial auditors will rely on in-house IT specialists more when they 
possess overlapping domain knowledge. Consistent with H1, the estimated marginal mean 
(standard error) of planned quality budget hours is 210.70 hours (24.84 hours) for participants 
responding to control risk assessments made by in-house IT specialists possessing overlapping 
domain knowledge and 166.01 hours (24.33 hours) for participants responding to control risk 
assessments made by in-house IT specialists with distinct domain knowledge.  
H3 predicts that financial auditors will rely on outsourced IT specialists more when the 
IT specialists have distinct domain knowledge. Consistent with H3, the estimated marginal mean 
(standard error) of planned quality budget hours is 263.12 hours (25.76 hours) for participants 
responding to control risk assessments made by outsourced IT specialists possessing distinct 
domain knowledge and 206.65 hours (25.27 hours) for participants responding to control risk 
assessments made by outsourced IT specialists with overlapping domain knowledge. 
                                                 
17
 When the ten participants that failed either of the manipulation check questions are excluded from the analysis, 
results of the ANCOVA are qualitatively similar. Though the pattern of reliance is consistent with the pattern in 
Figure 3, the lower power of my test fails to detect significance on the spatial distance main effect (F-statistic = 
2.633, p-value = 0.112, untabulated) or on the interaction of domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance 
(F-statistic = 2.456, p-value = 0.124, untabulated). 
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5.1.2 Effect of Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness on Reliance when Spatial Distance is Absent 
and when Spatial Distance is Present 
In order to more specifically test H1 and H3, I perform  Least Square Differences  (LSD) 
pairwise comparisons (see Panel C of Table 2). H1 predicts that planned quality budget hours 
will be higher for in-house IT specialists possessing overlapping domain knowledge than for in-
house IT specialists possessing distinct domain knowledge, while H3 predicts planned quality 
budget hours to be higher for outsourced IT specialists with distinct (as opposed to overlapping) 
domain knowledge.  
Results of the pairwise comparisons provide nearly marginal support for H1 and marginal 
support for H3. The difference in the estimated marginal means of planned quality budgets hours 
between overlapping domain knowledge (EMM = 210.70, std. error = 24.84) and distinct domain 
knowledge (EMM = 166.01, std. dev. = 24.33) when the IT specialist is in-house is almost 
marginally significant (EMM difference = 44.69, one-tailed p-value = 0.103, 95% CI: [-114.51, 
25.13]), providing no support for H1. When the IT specialist is outsourced, the difference in the 
estimated marginal means of planned quality budgets hours between distinct domain knowledge 
(EMM = 263.12, std. error = 25.76) and overlapping domain knowledge (EMM = 206.65, std. 
dev. = 25.27) is not statistically significant either (EMM difference = 56.47, one-tailed p-value = 
0.063, 95% CI: [-16.24, 129.18]), providing some evidence in support of H3.  
The pairwise comparison of the estimated marginal means of planned quality budget 
hours between the conditions in which spatial distance between the IT specialist and financial 
auditor is present and the conditions in which there is no spatial distance between the IT 
specialist and the financial auditor reveals a marginally statistically significant difference (EMM 
difference = 46.52, one-tailed p-value = 0.035, 95% CI: [-3.76, 96.81]), providing support for 
H2.  
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Though I make no prediction with regards to the difference in reliance on IT specialists 
with overlapping domain knowledge that are in-house vs. outsourced, the pairwise comparison of 
the estimated marginal means of planned quality budget hours for these conditions reveals that 
the difference is not statistically significant (EMM difference = 4.06, p-value = 0.909, 95% CI: [-
66.84, 74.96], untabulated). This result indicates that the difference in planned budget hours 
across the two levels of spatial distance as predicted by H2 is driven entirely by conditions in 
which the IT specialist possesses distinct domain knowledge and not overlapping domain 
knowledge. This effect is further supported by the statistically significant difference between the 
estimated marginal means of planned quality budget hours for distinct domain knowledge IT 
specialists that are in-house and distinct domain knowledge IT specialists that are outsourced 
(EMM difference = -97.11, two-tailed p-value = 0.008 , 95% CI: [-167.87, -26.34], untabulated). 
Thus, H2 is supported solely because of the differences in financial auditor reliance on IT 
specialists from different office locations that possess distinct domain knowledge.  
5.2 Judgments about the IT Specialist’s Competence 
 Participants made an assessment of the level of competence of the IT specialist in the 
post-experimental questionnaire. The level of competence was measured using an 11-point 
Likert scale ranging from “1-Very Low” to “11-Very High.” Assessments of competence satisfy 
assumptions of homogeneity of variance across treatments (Levene’s Test, F-statistic = 1.736, p-
value = 0.170). Additionally, Shapiro-Wilk’s tests of the assumption of normality indicate 
competence is normally distributed across all conditions with the exception of the outsourced-
distinct domain knowledge condition (p-value = 0.014). However, ANCOVA is a robust method 
given the near balanced nature of my design (Hair et al. 2010).  
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5.2.1 Effect of Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness on Judgments 
Figure 4 depicts participants’ estimated marginal mean competence ratings of the IT 
specialist by condition when controlling for perceptions of IT specialist expertise in performing 
IT control risk assessments. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for competence assessments 
by condition (Panel A) as well as ANCOVA and pairwise comparison results pertaining to H4a 
(Panels B and C, respectively).
18
 H4a predicts that assessments of competence will be higher for  
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Figure 4: Assessments of Competence 
 
IT specialists possessing overlapping domain knowledge than for IT specialists possessing 
distinct domain knowledge. Results indicate that domain knowledge distinctiveness does have a 
statistically significant main effect on assessments of competence (F-statistic = 4.340, p-value =  
                                                 
18
 Levene’s test of equality of error variances indicates that estimated marginal mean assessments of competence 
exhibit homogeneity of variance across conditions when IT specialist expertise is included as a covariate (F-statistic 
= 0.906, p-value = 0.444, untabulated). Furthermore, the covariate included in the model is uncorrelated with and 
does not interact with the independent variables, satisfying conditions for an effective ANCOVA. 
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Table 3: Effect of Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness on Assessments of Competence 
Panel A: Assessments of Competence, Estimated Marginal Mean (Standard Error)
Cell 1 Cell 3
Cell 2 Cell 4
Panel B: ANCOVA  Model of Assessments of Competence
Type III SS df F -statistic p -value
Model 220.119 4 21.045 <0.001
Spatial Distance 1.290 1 0.493 0.485
Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness (H4a) 11.348 1 4.340 0.042
Spatial Distance × Domain Knowledge Dist. 0.028 1 0.011 0.918
  IT Specialist Expertise 198.710 1 75.994 <0.001
Error 455469.708 55
R² = 0.605; Adjusted R ² = 0.576
Panel C: Pairwise Comparison
Comparisons (EMM Diff. [Std. Error]) 95% CI Hypothesis
(Cells 2+4)/2 vs. (Cells 1+3)/2   (0.87 [0.418])      0.03, 1.71 H4a 0.042
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7.28 7.53
6.54
(0.40) (0.43) (0.30)
n = 16 n = 14 n = 30
7.41
(0.42) (0.42) (0.30)
n = 15 n = 15 n = 30
6.83 7.12 6.972
(0.29) (0.30) (0.21)
n = 31 n = 29 n = 60
Assessments of level of competence of the IT specialist were made in the post-experimental questionnaire and were measured using 
an 11-point Likert scale ranging from "1-Very Low" to "11-Very High."  
The covariate included in the model is perceived IT specialist expertise in terms of performing IT control risk assessments 
(measured on an 7-point Likert scale ranging from "1-Low Level of Expertise" to "4-Moderate Level of Expertise" to "7-High Level 
of Expertise").
* The p -value in Panel C is the two-tailed p -value based on Least Significant Difference.
Sources of Variation
p -value*
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0.042)
19
, providing support for H4a. Further support for H4a is provided by the statistically 
significant pairwise comparison of the estimated marginal means of the distinct and overlapping 
domain knowledge conditions (EMM difference = 0.87, one-tailed p-value = 0.021, 95% CI: 
[0.03, 1.71]). Thus, H4a is supported. 
5.2.2 The Relation between Assessments of Competence and Actual Reliance Decisions 
H4b predicts that financial auditors assessments of IT specialist competence will be 
negatively correlated (or uncorrelated) with planned quality budget hours (i.e., actual reliance 
decisions). In order to test H4b, I estimate the following regression model (see Table 4):  
                                                                      
                           (1) 
 
While the Shapiro-Wilk’s test of normality suggests a violation of the assumptions of normality 
for the planned quality budget hours dependent variable; visual examination of the histogram of 
standardized residuals suggests that the distribution is relatively normal. Furthermore, visual 
examination of a scatterplot of the standardized residuals vs. the standardized predicted values 
indicate no pattern exists that is suggestive of a violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity 
or linearity. The assumption of linearity, E[ε] = 0, is also satisfied as visual examination of the 
scatterplots of the independent variables against the standardized residuals do not indicate the 
presence of curvilinear patterns. Thus, all assumptions underlying regression appear to be 
satisfied for equation (1) above.  
Covariates included in the model include audit planning experience in months and 
perception of the reliability of the controls based on the IT specialist’s overall control risk 
                                                 
19
 When the ten participants that failed either of the manipulation check questions are excluded from the analysis, 
results of the ANCOVA continue to reveal the statistically significant main effect of domain knowledge 
distinctiveness (F-statistic = 5.133, p-value = 0.028, untabulated). 
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Table 4: Relation between Assessments of Competence and Actual Reliance Decisions 
(1)
Pred. Sign Coefficient Std. Error t -statistic
p -value 
(2-tailed)
(Constant) 284.252 49.495 5.778 <0.001
Competence (H4b) −/Ø -7.236 5.164 -1.401 0.167
  Audit Planning Experience ? 0.384 0.126 3.034 0.004
  Reliability of Controls − -10.883 5.931 -1.835 0.072
Global F -statistic = 5.281, p -value = 0.003
R² = 0.221; Adjusted R ² = 0.179
Explanatory Variables
The dependent variable "planned quality budget hours" is a proxy for degree of reliance on the IT specialist. It is calculated as the 
aggregate of the products of staffing, timing, and budgeted hours for each procedure for the sales and collection cycle. Staffing is an 
ordinal variable capturing the experience of the staff performing the procedure (1 = staff auditor, 2 = senior, 3 = manager). Timing is 
also an ordinal variable capturing the reliability of a procedure performed either at interim (1) or at year-end (2).
Covariates included in the model are total number of months of audit planning experience and perceived reliability of the controls 
based on the IT specialist's overall control risk assessment (measured on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from "1-Very Unreliable" to 
"11-Very Reliable."
                          
                                           
                           
 
assessment. I make no predictions about the relation between the extent of audit planning 
experience and planned quality budget hours. However, I expect a negative association between 
reliability of controls and planned quality budget hours because perceptions of more reliable 
controls should allow for reducing the scope of planned substantive tests in the audit plan. 
Consistent with H4b, results of the equation (1) regression found in Table 4 indicate that 
financial auditors’ assessments of competence (i.e., judgments) are negatively associated with 
planned quality budget hours (i.e., actual reliance decisions) and this association is marginally 
significant (β1 = -7.236, std. error = 5.164, t-statistic = -1.401, one-tailed p-value = 0.084). Also 
as expected, perceptions of the reliability of controls are negatively associated with the number 
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quality budget hours planned (β3 = -10.883, std. error = 5.931, t-statistic = -1.835, one-tailed p-
value = 0.036).
20
 Thus, H4b is supported. 
5.2.3 Identification as a Suppressor of the Relation between Assessments of Competence and 
Actual Reliance Decisions 
 H5 predicts that the inconsistent (non-positive association) between assessments of 
competence and actual reliance decisions is suppressed by the financial auditor’s level of 
identification with the IT specialist. To test this hypothesis, I conduct a bootstrapping mediation 
analysis, which is estimated using 1,000 bootstrap iterations (see Hayes 2012). Figure 5 
illustrates the conceptual model predicted by H5 as well as the estimated path coefficients for the 
model. Results in Figure 5 provide support for H5. The statistically significant negative direct  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
Assessments of IT specialist competence is measured on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from “1-Very Low” to “11-Very High.”  
Auditor identification with the IT specialist is an average of three items measured using 9-point Likert scales with higher values 
representing greater levels of identification. 
Reliance is measured as total quality budget hours planned by the financial auditor for the current year audit. 
Covariates included in the mediation model above include audit planning experience in months and perceived reliability of the 
controls based on the IT specialist’s overall control risk assessment. 
All p-values in this figure are two-tailed. 
Figure 5: Identity as a Suppressor 
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 When the ten participants that failed either of the manipulation check questions are excluded from the regression 
analysis, results reveal a statistically significant negative relation between competence and planned quality budget 
hours (β1 = -11.281, t-statistic = -2.093, one-tailed p-value = 0.021).  
Assessments of IT 
Specialist Competence 
Auditor Identification with 
the IT Specialist 
Reliance on the  
IT Specialist TOTAL EFFECT: 
c1   = -7.2360 p = 0.1666 
DIRECT EFFECT: 
c`1 = -10.7433 p = 0.0394 
INDIRECT EFFECT (H5): 
a1b1 = 3.5073 p < 0.05 
     BootLLCI  =   0.4794 
 BootULCI = 10.7669 
a1 = 0.1853  p = 0.0465 b1 = 18.9286 p = 0.0112 
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effect of competence on reliance (effect = -10.74, p-value = 0.039) is suppressed by the 
statistically significant indirect effect through identification (effect = 3.507, p-value < 0.05), 
resulting in a marginally significant negative total effect of competence on reliance (effect = -
7.24, one-tailed p-value = 0.084).
21
 Thus, H5 is supported. 
                                                 
21
 When the ten participants that failed either of the manipulation check questions are excluded from the mediation 
analysis, results are directionally consistent; however, the indirect effect of competence on reliance through 
identification is not statistically significant (untabulated), likely due to a lack of power. 
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6. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS 
 This section discusses exploratory findings related to variables that provide insight about 
auditors’ perceptions in practice. I also provide a more detailed analysis of auditor reliance by 
examining the different types of changes made to the scope of the audit plan (i.e., nature, 
staffing, timing, and extent). 
6.1 Credibility Assessments, Paid-Advice Perceptions, Exclusivity Perceptions, and 
Perceptions of Dilution 
Credibility assessments and exclusivity perceptions are composite measures made up of 
various items. The credibility assessments were made by participants both after exposure to the 
manipulations but prior to the audit planning decision task as well as subsequent to the audit 
planning decision task when they were reminded about D.J. Richard’s office location and 
professional designation(s).
22
 Exclusivity perceptions and perceptions of dilution were captured 
in the post-experimental questionnaire. 
6.1.1 Perceived IT Specialist Credibility  
In order to capture participants’ perceptions of IT specialist credibility, I gathered 
assessments about five statements. Statements related to the strength of control testing performed 
by the IT specialist (1-Very Weak to 10-Very Strong), the accuracy of the IT specialist’s control 
risk assessments (1-Not Accurate to 10-Very Accurate), the reliability of the workpaper prepared 
                                                 
22
 The reminder of the IT specialist’s office location and professional designation was specified on screen according 
to participant’s previously randomly assigned condition. 
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by the IT specialist (1-Not Reliable to 10-Very Reliable), the credibility of the IT specialist as a 
source of control testing and risk assessment (1-Not at All Credible to 10-Very Credible), and the 
trustworthiness of the IT specialist with respect to preparing the control testing and risk 
assessment workpapers (1-Not at All Trustworthy to 10-Very Trustworthy). A principal 
component factor analysis of these five items indicates that all five items load onto one 
component, or construct. The five items have good internal consistency and appear to measure 
the same construct as indicated by a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.951 for the measures taken prior to 
the audit planning task and 0.964 for the measures taken in the post-experimental questionnaire 
after reminding participants about the IT specialist’s office location (i.e., spatial distance) and 
professional designation(s) (i.e., domain knowledge distinctiveness). As a result, I average the 
five pre-task (post-experimental) items to reflect participants’ assessments of IT specialist 
credibility at those separate points in time. 
First, I examine the correlation between the pre-task and post-experimental assessments 
of IT specialist credibility and find that these two measures are highly correlated (Pearson r = 
0.885, two-tailed p-value < 0.001). The mean (standard deviation) pre-task assessment of IT 
specialist credibility is 6.21 (2.138), while the mean (standard deviation) of post-experimental 
assessment of IT specialist credibility is 6.52 (2.05). I estimate a MANCOVA to test for 
differences between conditions on these two credibility measures. The omnibus test for a fully 
crossed model including the independent variables of domain knowledge distinctiveness and 
spatial distance and including covariates of participants’ firm size and participants’ perceptions 
about what type of auditor they are (ranging from “1-Financial Auditor” to “5-IT Auditor”) was 
non-significant (untabulated), indicating that there are no differences in assessments of IT 
specialist credibility across conditions.  
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Next, I create a difference variable of the IT specialist credibility assessment by 
subtracting the pre-task average IT specialist credibility measure from the post-experimental 
(i.e., after a reminder of the manipulations) average IT specialist credibility measure. I estimate 
an ANCOVA in which I control for the participant’s firm size and the type of auditor they 
perceive themselves to be (Global F-statistic = 2.664, p-value = 0.032).
23
 Estimated marginal 
means of the credibility difference score can be found in Panel A of Table 5. ANCOVA results 
found in Panel B of Table 5 indicate that there is a statistically significant main effect of spatial 
distance on the difference scores of IT specialist credibility (F-statistic = 4.790, p-value = 0.033). 
Post-experimental IT specialist credibility is assessed as higher than pre-task IT specialist 
credibility for IT specialists that are not spatially distant (mean = 0.58, std. error = 0.17, Panel A 
of Table 5), while there appears to be no difference in pre-task and post-experimental scores 
when IT specialists are spatially distant (mean = 0.02, std. error = 0.18, Panel A of Table 5). A 
Bonferroni comparison of the estimated marginal means of the credibility difference score for 
the IT specialist that is not spatially distant and the IT specialist that is spatially distant reveals a 
statistically significant difference (EMM difference = 0.56, one-tailed p-value  0.011, 95% Wald 
CI: [0.08, 1.04], Panel C of Table 5). 
These results suggest that after participants in the in-house IT specialist condition became 
fully aware of their manipulations, they adjusted their credibility assessments upward by an 
average of 0.6 points on a 10-point Likert scale. However, after participants in the outsourced IT 
specialist condition became fully aware of their manipulations, they did not appear to adjust their  
                                                 
23
 Levene’s test of equality of error variances indicates that estimated marginal means of the IT specialist credibility 
difference score exhibit homogeneity of variance across conditions when participant firm size and perceptions of 
participant auditor type are included as covariates (F-statistic = 0.767, p-value = 0.517, untabulated). Visual 
examination of histograms of the IT specialist credibility difference score dependent variable indicates that the 
assumption of normality is satisfied across conditions. Furthermore, the covariate included in the model is 
uncorrelated with and does not interact with the independent variables, satisfying conditions for an effective 
ANCOVA. 
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Table 5: Difference Scores of IT Specialist Credibility by Condition 
Panel A: IT Specialist Credibility Difference Scores, Estimated Marginal Mean (Standard Error)
Cell 1 Cell 3
Cell 2 Cell 4
Panel B: ANCOVA  Model IT Specialist Credibility Difference Scores
Type III SS df F -statistic p -value
Model 11.864 5 2.664 0.032
Spatial Distance 4.266 1 4.790 0.033
Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness 1.505 1 1.690 0.199
Spatial Distance × Domain Knowledge Dist. 0.380 1 0.427 0.516
  Firm size 2.531 1 2.842 0.098
  Auditor Type 3.761 1 4.223 0.045
Error 48.090 54
R² = 0.198; Adjusted R ² = 0.124
Panel C: Bonferroni Comparison of IT Specialist Credibility Difference Scores
Comparisons (EMM Diff. [Std. Error]) 95% Wald CI Hypothesis
(Cells 1+2)/2 vs. (Cells 3+4)/2   (0.56 [0.244])      0.08, 1.04 NA 0.021
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(0.24) (0.26) (0.17)
n = 16 n = 14 n = 30
0.46
(0.25) (0.25) (0.17)
n = 15 n = 15 n = 30
0.58 0.02 0.30
(0.17) (0.18) (0.12)
n = 31 n = 29 n = 60
Sources of Variation
Assessments of IT specialist credibility is an average measure of five items measuring the IT specialist's strength of control testing, 
accuracy of control risk assessments, workpaper reliability, source credibility, and trustworthiness with respect to preparing the control 
testing and risk assessment workpaper. The items were measured on a 10-point Likert scale varying from low to high on the 
aforementioned attributes. The five items were captured after exposure to the manipulation but before the audit planning task as well as 
in the post-experimental questionnaire when participants were reminded of their manipulations. The difference score reflects the 
difference between the post-experimental average credibility measure and the pre-task average credibility measure. 
Covariates included in the model include participants' firm size and participants’ perceptions about what type of auditor they are 
(ranging from “1-Financial Auditor” to “5-IT Auditor”).
*The p -value in Panel C is the Bonferroni two-tailed p -value adjusted for the all pairwise comparisons. It is directly comparable to 
alpha of 0.05.
p -value*
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credibility assessments.
24
 Consequently, conscious awareness of social similarity with the IT 
specialist in terms of spatial distance (i.e., same office location of the IT specialist) results in 
more favorable assessments of IT specialist credibility than when social similarity with the IT 
specialist in terms of spatial distance is operating at a subconscious level. This finding appears to 
have implications for theory on social identification as it reflects a desire for financial auditors to 
display an in-group bias towards IT specialists in their own office when they are fully aware that 
the IT specialist is part of the same office. Alternatively, financial auditors don’t appear to need 
to adjust their credibility assessments for IT specialists that are outsourced from other offices. 
6.1.2 Paid-Advice Perceptions 
 In order to ensure that participants’ audit planning decisions were being driven by the 
dimensions of social similarity manipulated in this study and not by perceptions of cost of the IT 
specialist, paid-advice perceptions were captured. In the post-experimental questionnaire, 
participants were asked to respond to the following question: “Relative to the average cost of 
employing a staff auditor, how costly do you believe it was to employ D.J. Richards to the 
engagement for the purpose of testing controls and performing control risk assessments?” 
Responses were captured using an 11-point Likert scale ranging from “1-Much Less Costly” to 
“6-Equally Costly” to “11-Much More Costly.” This paid-advice perception is uncorrelated with 
any of dependent variables in this study. 
                                                 
24
 Closer examination of the estimated marginal means for participants in the spatial distance present condition 
(Panel A of Table 5) illustrate that participants in the distinct domain knowledge condition reduced their credibility 
assessments slightly (estimated marginal mean = -0.22, std. error = 0.26), while those in the overlapping domain 
knowledge condition increased their credibility assessments slightly (estimated marginal mean = 0.26, std. error = 
0.25), resulting in an estimated marginal mean that approximates zero for all participants in the spatial distance 
present condition. 
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 I conduct an ANCOVA on the paid-advice dependent variable, controlling for 
participants’ level of motivation to determine whether there are differences across groups 
(Global F-statistic = 3.479, p-value = 0.013, untabulated).
25
 The ANCOVA reveals a statistically  
significant main effect of domain knowledge distinctiveness (F-statistic = 6.535, p-value = 
0.013, untabulated). Interestingly, the pattern of estimated marginal means suggests that IT 
specialists with distinct domain knowledge (i.e., CISA) are perceived to be more costly (8.55 on 
the 11-point scale) than IT specialists with overlapping domain knowledge (i.e., CISA-CPA) 
(7.46 on the 11-point scale). This result is counterintuitive since one would expect an individual 
to be paid a premium for possessing more professional designations. Perhaps this reflects 
participants’ beliefs that IT specialists with distinct domain knowledge are true domain experts. 
6.1.3 Perceived Exclusivity of the CPA Profession 
In some cases, the individual perceives particular aspects of social identity to be scarce 
resources (Harrison 1999). For example, a financial auditor possessing a CPA designation may 
view this professional designation to be a scarce resource in that it should be protected from 
appropriation by others such as IT specialists so that the inherent value of possessing a CPA is 
not diminished. The more exclusive a group, the more concerned its members are likely to be 
with restricting the reproduction of its group identity (Harrison 1999). In order to ensure that 
differences in perceptions of CPA profession exclusivity do not drive my results, I made sure to 
include items in my post-experimental questionnaire aimed at measuring this construct.  
Eight items were gathered in an attempt to measure the latent construct of perceived 
exclusivity of the CPA profession. Participants were told to “Imagine that you have recently 
                                                 
25
 Levene’s test of equality of error variances indicates that the number of planned procedures dependent variable 
satisfies the assumption of homogeneity of variance (F-statistic = 0.710, p-value = 0.550, untabulated). The 
covariate included in the model is uncorrelated with the independent variables and does not interact with the 
independent variables of interest, satisfying conditions for an effective ANCOVA. 
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been licensed as a CPA (Certified Public Accountant) after completing the 150 credit hour 
requirement as well as the 1 year full-time work experience requirement.” They were then 
instructed to indicate their level of agreement (8-point Likert scale ranging from 1-Strongly 
Disagree to 2-Strongly Agree) with the eight statements found in Figure 6. The order of the eight 
statements was randomized. Principal component analysis was used to extract constructs based 
on responses on these eight items. Results indicate that the three items in Figure 6 that have 
asterisks next to them (4, 6, and 8) load onto one construct, which appears to reflect perceptions 
of exclusivity of the CPA profession. The Cronbach’s alpha for these three items measuring 
exclusivity is 0.866, indicating good internal consistency. Since the three items appear to 
measure my construct of interest, I average the three exclusivity items to form one measure of 
participants’ perceptions of CPA profession exclusivity.  
Eight Items Gathered to Measure Exclusivity of the CPA Profession
*
*
*
6. The CPA profession is a prestigious  group of individuals.
7. Individuals from other disciplines  (besides accounting) should be permitted to become 
members of the CPA profession.
8. Strict licensure requirements ensures that the public will continue to view members of the 
CPA profession as credible  and trustworthy.
* Items that loaded onto the same construct when principal components analysis was performed 
on the eight items. Cronbach's alpha for items 4, 6, and 8 = 0.866.
1. The public accounting profession should make it easier for future applicants to obtain a CPA 
professional designation.
2. The 150 credit hour education requirement ensures that members of the CPA profession 
possess the minimum knowledge necessary.
3. The work experience requirement of 1 year of full-time work or 2 years of part-time work 
ensures that members of the CPA profession possess the minimum experience necessary.
4. Members of the CPA profession form part of an exclusive  group of individuals.
5. Anyone  should be permitted to become a member of the CPA profession.
 
Figure 6: Measures of CPA Profession Exclusivity 
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Perceptions of CPA profession exclusivity do not differ statistically across conditions and 
the measure is not a significant covariate in any of my models. Overall, evidence suggests that 
the auditor participants in my study view the CPA profession as a highly exclusive group, as 
reflected by a mean of 6.5 (std. dev. = 1.38) on an 8-point Likert scale ranging from “1-Strongly 
Disagree” to “8-Strongly Agree” in terms of statements reflecting exclusivity.  
6.1.4 Perceptions of Dilution of Additional Designations 
 In order to measure whether participants perceive individuals with two designations as 
being less of an expert than those possessing only one designation in their domain of expertise, 
participants were asked to “consider a situation in which an individual possesses two 
professional designations: one in his/her field of expertise and one in an area outside his/her 
field of expertise.” Auditor participants responded to several statements meant to capture their 
beliefs about the value of more than one professional designation by indicating their level of 
agreement with the statements found in Figure 7 using an 8-point Likert scale ranging from “1-
Strongly Disagree” to “8-Strongly Agree.”  
Three Items Gathered to Measure Perceptions of Dilution of Additional Designations
Items were measured using an 8-point Likert scale ranging from "1-Strongly Disagree" to "8-Strongly Agree."
1. No one can be an expert in multiple fields. By having two professional designations, this 
individual is a "jack of all trades" and not an expert in his/her field.
2. The more professional designations a person has, the more intelligent and competent that 
individual is. By having two professional designations, this individual is an expert in multiple 
fields.
3. A second professional designation does not have any meaningful effect on a person's 
competence. Having two professional designations in no way affects this individual's 
competence.
 
Figure 7: Measures of Perceptions of Dilution of Additional Designations 
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The first item in Figure 7 is a measure intended to capture participants’ perceptions of 
how strongly they believe that an individual’s expertise is diluted when additional knowledge is 
acquired in another domain. The second item is intended to gauge participants’ agreement with 
the notion that additional designations reflect additional expertise. The last item measures 
participants’ agreement with the belief that additional designations have no impact on an 
individual’s competence.  
A MANOVA revealed no statistically significant differences in these measures across 
conditions (all omnibus test statistics non-significant at alpha-level of 0.05, untabulated).
26
 The 
mean (standard deviation) of agreement with the first statement is 2.48 (1.672) out of 8, 
suggesting that participants disagree with the idea of additional professional designations 
diluting expertise. The mean (standard deviation) agreement with the second statement is 4.07 
(2.074), suggesting that participants agree more with the notion of additional designations 
reflecting additional expertise than the idea that additional designations dilute expertise (paired-
samples t-statistic = 4.219, two-tailed p-value < 0.001, 95% CI: [0.83, 2.33], untabulated). 
However, a mean of 4.07 on an 8-point Likert scale indicates neither agreeing nor disagreeing 
with the statement (neutrality). Finally, mean agreement with the third statement indicating 
additional designations have no effect on competence was 3.43 (std. dev. = 2.11), which is more 
agreement than the first jack-of-all trades statement (paired samples t-statistic = 3.541, two-tailed 
p-value = 0.001, 95% CI: [0.413, 1.487], untabulated). However, there is no statistical difference 
in agreement between the statement indicating additional professional designations reflect more 
                                                 
26
 Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices indicates that the covariance matrices of the dependent variables 
across groups is equal (Box’s M,= 18.403, F-statistic = 0.922, p-value = 0.552, untabulated). Because the Shapiro-
Wilk’s test of normality indicates a violation of multivariate normality, I also conduct the Levene’s test of equality 
of error variances on the three items, which indicate that all three items satisfy the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance across conditions (p-values > 0.05, untabulated). 
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intelligence/competence and the statement indicating additional designations have no effect on 
competence (paired samples t-statistic = 1.391, two-tailed p-value = 0.169, 95% CI: [-0.278, 
1.544], untabulated ). 
Overall, participants appear to disagree with the idea of additional designations reflecting 
a dilution of expertise and exhibit neutrality in opinions about designations reflecting more or 
less knowledge. Perhaps participants believe that there is more to expertise and competence than 
professional designations. 
6.2 Effect of Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness and Spatial Distance on the Nature, 
Staffing, Timing and Extent of Planned Procedures 
 This section probes deeper into auditor reliance decisions by describing how the nature, 
staffing, timing, and extent of audit planning differs when domain knowledge distinctiveness and 
spatial distance of the IT specialist is manipulated. All measures of these different types of scope 
decisions are measured consistent with Brazel and Agoglia (2007). Descriptions of the measures 
of these scope dependent variables can be found in the sections that follow. 
In order to determine whether there are differences in the audit scope dependent variables 
(i.e., nature, staffing, timing, and extent) across conditions in my study, I conduct a MANCOVA 
controlling for participants’ possession of a college degree with an IS minor, number of months 
of planning experience, motivation, perceived IT specialist expertise in terms of IT control risk 
assessments, and participants’ perceptions of the overall reliability of controls based on the IT 
specialist’s control testing and risk assessment workpaper. The omnibus tests for a fully crossed 
model including the independent variables of domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial 
distance as well as the covariates listed above reveal a statistically significant interaction of 
domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance (F-statistic = 2.857, p-value = 0.033, 
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untabulated), indicating that there are differences in audit scope decisions across conditions.
27
 
Since the MANCOVA reveals statistically significant differences across groups, I examine 
ANCOVAs for each of the scope dependent variables in the following sections. 
6.2.1 Nature of Planned Audit Procedures 
The nature of participants’ scope decisions is measured as the total number of procedures 
planned. The mean (standard deviation) number of audit procedures planned by participants in 
the study is 11.97 (1.922). The original number of procedures planned in the prior year audit 
budget was 12. Thus, a one-sample t-test reveals that there is no difference in the number of 
audit procedures planned by participants relative to the prior year’s number of audit procedures 
planned (t-statistic = -0.134, two-tailed p-value = 0.894, 95% CI: [-0.530, 0.463], untabulated). 
Next, I perform an ANCOVA on participants’ scope decisions related to the nature of 
procedures to be performed (i.e., the number of audit procedures planned by participants), 
controlling for whether participants earned a college degree with an IS minor and for 
participants’ planning experience in months (Global F-statistic = 3.505, p-value = 0.008, Panel B 
of Table 6).
28
 Estimated marginal means of participants’ nature decisions are depicted in Figure 
8 and tabulated in Panel A of Table 6.  
                                                 
27
 Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices indicates that the covariance matrices of the dependent variables 
across groups are not equal (Box’s M,= 67.217, F-statistic = 1.945, p-value = 0.001, untabulated). Since Box’s test is 
sensitive to violations of normality and the Shapiro-Wilk’s test of normality indicates violations to the multivariate 
normality assumption, I also conduct the Levene’s test of equality of error variances on the four dependent variables. 
Levene’s tests indicate that all four items satisfy the assumption of homogeneity of variance across conditions (p-
values > 0.05, untabulated). Furthermore, visual examination of histograms of the dependent variable measures by 
condition indicates there are only slight departures from normality.  
28
 Levene’s test of equality of error variances indicates that the number of planned procedures dependent variable 
satisfies the assumption of homogeneity of variance (F-statistic = 0.334, p-value = 0.801, untabulated). Covariates 
included in the model are uncorrelated with the independent variables. While participants’ possession of a college 
degree with an IS minor does not interact with the IVs of interest, there is a three-way interaction among audit 
planning experience, domain knowledge distinctiveness, and spatial distance (F-statistic = 13.939, p-value = <0.001, 
untabulated), failing to satisfy all conditions for an effective ANCOVA. When interactions of audit planning 
experience interactions and the IVs are included in the model, the spatial distance main effect disappears (F-statistic 
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ANCOVA results are tabulated in Panel B of Table 6. Results reveal a statistically 
significant main effect of spatial distance on participants’ nature decisions (F-statistic = 4.351, p-
value = 0.042), such that auditor participants planned, on average, approximately one additional 
11.7
12.2
11.3
12.7
11.0
11.5
12.0
12.5
13.0
Absent
(In-House)
Present
(Outsourced)
E
s
ti
m
a
te
d
 
M
a
r
g
in
a
l 
M
e
a
n
s
 o
f 
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f 
P
la
n
n
e
d
 
A
u
d
it
 
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
Spatial Distance
Distinct
(CISA)
Overlapping
(CISA-CPA)
Domain Knowledge 
Distinctiveness:
 
Figure 8: Nature Audit Scope Decisions 
procedure when the IT specialist was spatially distant (EMM difference = 0.94, std. error 
difference = 0.428, Bonferroni p-value = 0.028, 95% Wald CI: [0.10, 1.78], untabulated). Hence, 
it appears that auditors’ nature decisions are more responsive to the control risk assessments of 
spatially distant IT specialists. 
6.2.2 Staffing of Planned Audit Procedures 
 The staffing of participants’ scope decisions is measured as the number of procedures 
assigned to a more senior-level auditor than a staff-assistant. The mean (standard deviation)  
                                                                                                                                                             
= 2.770, p-value = 0.102, untabulated) and the interaction of domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance 
becomes marginally statistically significant (F-statistic = 2.873, p-value 0.096, untabulated). 
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Table 6: Nature Audit Scope Decisions by Condition 
Panel A: Number of Planned Audit Procedures, Estimated Marginal Mean (Standard Error)
Panel B: ANCOVA  Model of Number of Planned Audit Procedures
Type III SS df F -statistic p -value
Model 53.393 5 3.505 0.008
Spatial Distance 13.258 1 4.351 0.042
Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness 0.268 1 0.088 0.768
Spatial Distance × Domain Knowledge Dist. 3.081 1 1.011 0.319
  IS Minor 19.816 1 6.503 0.014
  Audit Planning Experience 17.661 1 5.796 0.020
Error 164.540 54
R² = 0.245; Adjusted R ² = 0.175
n = 31 n = 29 n = 60
Sources of Variation
The number of planned audit procedures dependent variable is calculated as the total number of procedures planned by the 
participant in response to the IT specialist's control testing and risk assessment workpaper. 
Covariates included in the model include a variable capturing whether participant's acquired a college degree with an IS minor and 
participants’ audit planning experience in months.
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number of audit procedures planned by participants to be performed by more senior level staff is 
3.22 (3.031). None of the original procedures planned in the prior year audit budget were 
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assigned to a level of staff higher than staff-assistant. A one-sample t-test reveals that there is a 
statistically significant difference in the number of procedures staffed with more senior-level 
staff relative to the prior year (t-statistic = 8.219, two-tailed p-value <0.001, 95% CI: [2.434, 
4.000], untabulated). 
Next, I perform an ANCOVA on participants’ staffing scope decisions (i.e., the number of 
audit procedures planned to be performed by more senior audit staff), controlling for 
participants’ planning experience in months, motivation, and perceived IT specialist expertise in 
terms of IT control risk assessments (Global F-statistic = 5.479, p-value <0.001, Panel B of 
Table 7).
29
 Estimated marginal means of participants’ staffing decisions are depicted in Figure 9 
and tabulated in Panel A of Table 7.  
ANCOVA results are tabulated in Panel B of Table 7. Results reveal no statistically 
significant main effect or interaction of domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance 
on participants’ staffing decisions. Hence, it appears that auditors’ staffing decisions are 
unaffected by the domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance of the IT specialist. 
                                                 
29
 Levene’s test of equality of error variances indicates that the number of more senior staff procedures dependent 
variable satisfies the assumption of homogeneity of variance (F-statistic = 0.384, p-value = 0.765, untabulated). 
Covariates included in the model are uncorrelated with the independent variables. While participants’ motivation 
and perception of IT specialist expertise does not interact with the IVs of interest, there is a three-way interaction 
among audit planning experience, domain knowledge distinctiveness, and spatial distance (F-statistic = 7.196, p-
value = 0.01, untabulated), failing to satisfy all conditions for an effective ANCOVA. When interactions of audit 
planning experience interactions and the IVs are included in the model, the spatial distance becomes marginally 
statistically significant (F-statistic = 3.647, p-value = 0.062, untabulated) and the interaction of domain knowledge 
distinctiveness and spatial distance becomes marginally statistically significant (F-statistic = 2.918, p-value 0.094, 
untabulated). 
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Table 7: Staffing Audit Scope Decisions by Condition 
Panel A: Number of More Senior Staff Procedures, Estimated Marginal Mean (Standard Error)
Panel B: ANCOVA  Model of Number of More Senior Staff Procedures
Type III SS df F -statistic p -value
Model 207.546 6 5.479 <0.001
Spatial Distance 8.292 1 1.313 0.257
Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness 1.567 1 0.248 0.620
Spatial Distance × Domain Knowledge Dist. 0.075 1 0.012 0.914
  Audit Planning Experience 154.917 1 24.536 <0.001
  Motivation 52.036 1 8.242 0.006
  IT Specialist Expertise 19.143 1 3.032 0.087
Error 334.637 53
R² = 0.383; Adjusted R ² = 0.313
n = 31 n = 29 n = 60
Sources of Variation
The number of more senior staff procedures dependent variable is calculated as the total number of procedures planned by the 
participant to be performed by a more senior level staff than staff-assistant in response to the IT specialist's control testing and risk 
assessment workpaper. 
Covariates included in the model include participants’ audit planning experience in months, motivation (measured on a 9-point Likert 
scale ranging from "1-Very Low" to "9-Very High"), and perceived IT specialist expertise in terms of performing IT control risk 
assessments (measured on an 7-point Likert scale ranging from "1-Low Level of Expertise" to "4-Moderate Level of Expertise" to "7-
High Level of Expertise").
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Figure 9: Staffing Audit Scope Decisions 
 
6.2.3 Timing of Planned Audit Procedures 
The timing of participants’ scope decisions is measured as the total number of testing 
hours budgeted at fiscal year-end (versus interim). The mean (standard deviation) number of 
testing hours scheduled by participants to be conducted at year-end is 54.05 (33.92). The original 
number of hours planned to be performed at year-end in the prior year budget was 15. A one-
sample t-test reveals that there is a statistically significant difference in the number of testing 
hours scheduled by participants to be performed at year-end relative to the prior year budget (t-
statistic = 8.917, two-tailed p-value <0.001, 95% CI: [30.287, 47.813],untabulated).  
Next, I perform an ANCOVA on participants’ timing scope decisions (i.e., the number of 
hours budgeted to be performed at year-end), controlling for participants’ planning experience in 
months, motivation, perceived IT specialist expertise in terms of IT control risk assessments, and 
perceived overall reliability of controls based on the IT specialist’s control risk assessment 
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(Global F-statistic = 3.457, p-value = 0.004, Panel B of Table 8).
30
 Estimated marginal means of 
participants’ timing decisions are depicted in Figure 10 and tabulated in Panel A of Table 8.  
ANCOVA results are tabulated in Panel B of Table 8. Results reveal a marginally 
statistically significant main effect of spatial distance on participants’ nature decisions (F-
statistic = 3.173, p-value = 0.081), such that auditor participants budgeted more year-end hours 
when the IT specialist was spatially distant compared to when the IT specialist was not spatially 
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Figure 10: Timing Audit Scope Decisions 
 
distant. Hence, it appears that auditors’ timing decisions are more responsive to the control risk 
assessments of spatially distant IT specialists. However, the presence of a statistically significant 
interaction of domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance (F-statistic = 4.124, p-value 
= 0.047) suggests that the aforementioned main effect may be driven by one of the conditions. 
Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 10, auditors planned approximately 25 hours more when the IT  
                                                 
30
 Levene’s test of equality of error variances indicates that the number of number of year-end budgeted hours 
dependent variable satisfies the assumption of homogeneity of variance (F-statistic = 1.703, p-value = 0.177, 
untabulated). The Shapiro-Wilk’s test of normality indicates that the dependent variable is normally distributed 
across all conditions. Covariates included in the model are uncorrelated with the independent variables and do not 
interact with the IVs of interest, satisfying conditions for an effective ANCOVA.  
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Table 8: Timing Audit Scope Decisions by Condition 
Panel A: Number of Year-End Budgeted Hours, Estimated Marginal Mean (Standard Error)
Cell 1 Cell 3
Cell 2 Cell 4
Panel B: ANCOVA  Model of Number of Year-End Budgeted Hours
Type III SS df F -statistic p -value
Model 21559.457 7 3.457 0.004
Spatial Distance 2827.341 1 3.173 0.081
Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness 1947.278 1 2.186 0.145
Spatial Distance × Domain Knowledge Dist. 3674.460 1 4.124 0.047
  Audit Planning Experience 2600.610 1 2.919 0.094
  Motivation 6616.329 1 7.426 0.009
  IT Specialist Expertise 4048.341 1 4.544 0.038
  Reliability of Controls 6022.611 1 6.759 0.012
Error 46331.393 52
R² = 0.318; Adjusted R ² = 0.226
Panel C: Bonferroni Comparisons of Number of Year-End Budgeted Hours
Comparisons (EMM Diff. [Std. Error]) Hypothesis
Cell 1 vs. Cell 2    (  -4.33 [ 9.996])  NA 1.000
Cell 1 vs. Cell 3    (-29.66 [10.226]) NA 0.022
Cell 1 vs. Cell 4    (  -2.40 [10.089]) NA 1.000
Cell 2 vs. Cell 3    (-25.32, [10.360]) NA 0.087
Cell 2 vs. Cell 4    (   1.92, [10.259]) NA 1.000
Cell 3 vs. Cell 4    ( 27.25, [10.442]) NA 0.054
n = 60
Sources of Variation
The number of year-end budgeted hours dependent variable is calculated as the total number of budgeted hours scheduled by the 
participant to be performed at year-end (as opposed to at interim) in response to the IT specialist's control testing and risk assessment 
workpaper. 
Covariates included in the model include participants’ audit planning experience in months, motivation (measured on a 9-point Likert 
scale ranging from "1-Very Low" to "9-Very High"), perceived IT specialist expertise in terms of performing IT control risk 
assessments (measured on an 7-point Likert scale ranging from "1-Low Level of Expertise" to "4-Moderate Level of Expertise" to "7-
High Level of Expertise"), and perceived overall reliability of controls based on the IT specialist's control risk assessment (measured on 
an 11-point Likert scale ranging from "1-Very Unreliable" to "11-Very Reliable").
* The p -value in Panel C is the Bonferroni two-tailed p -value adjusted for the all pairwise comparisons. It is directly comparable to 
alpha of 0.05.
p -value*95% Wald CI
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specialist had distinct domain knowledge and was spatially distant relative to all the other 
conditions. The Bonferroni comparisons found in Panel C of Table 8 provide additional support 
that the condition in which the IT specialist is spatially distant and possesses distinct domain 
knowledge (Cell 3) is the main driver of differences detected by the ANCOVA. Thus, the 
significant interaction suggests that the auditor’s timing scope decisions are most influenced 
when the IT specialist is socially dissimilar from the auditor on two dimensions: domain 
knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance. 
6.2.4 Extent of Planned Audit Procedures 
The extent of participants’ scope decisions is measured as the total number of audit hours 
budgeted for the current year’s audit plan. The mean (standard deviation) total number of audit 
hours planned by participants is 100.93 (28.413). The original number of budgeted hours in the 
prior year was 93. A one- sample t-test reveals that there is a statistically significant difference in 
the total number of hours budgeted by participants relative to the prior year’s total audit hours 
budgeted (t-statistic = 2.163, two-tailed p-value = 0.035, 95% CI: [0.594, 15.273], untabulated).  
Next, I conduct an ANOVA on participants’ extent scope decisions (i.e., the number of 
hours budgeted to be performed) (Global F-statistic = 3.892, p-value = 0.003, Panel B of Table 
9).
31
 Mean nature decisions are depicted in Figure 11 and tabulated in Panel A of Table 9.  
ANOVA results are tabulated in Panel B of Table 9. Results reveal a statistically 
significant main effect of spatial distance on participants’ nature decisions (F-statistic = 5.147, p- 
value = 0.027), such that participants budgeted more hours when the IT specialist was spatially 
                                                 
31
 No covariates were included in the model because none were correlated with the number of budgeted hours 
dependent variable. Levene’s test of equality of error variances indicates that the number of budgeted hours 
dependent variable satisfies the assumption of homogeneity of variance (F-statistic = 0.798, p-value = 0.500, 
untabulated). The Shapiro-Wilk’s test of normality indicates that the dependent variable is normally distributed 
across all conditions.  
75 
 
87.0
116.2
99.9
102.5
80
90
100
110
120
Absent
(In-House)
Present
(Outsourced)
E
s
ti
m
a
te
d
 
M
a
r
g
in
a
l 
M
e
a
n
s
 o
f 
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f 
B
u
d
g
e
te
d
 
H
o
u
r
s
Spatial Distance
Distinct
(CISA)
Overlapping
(CISA-CPA)
Domain Knowledge 
Distinctiveness:
 
Figure 11: Extent Scope Decisions 
 
distant than when there was no spatial distance. Hence, it appears that auditors’ extent scope 
decisions are more responsive to the control risk assessments of spatially distant IT specialists.  
However, the presence of a marginally statistically significant interaction of domain 
knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance (F-statistic = 3.602, p-value = 0.063) suggests 
that the aforementioned main effect may be driven by one of the factors. Indeed, as can be seen 
in Figure 11, auditors’ extent scope decisions do not differ in terms of spatial distance when the 
IT specialist has overlapping domain knowledge relative to the auditor (independent samples t-
statistic = -0.252, two-tailed p-value = 0.803, 95% CI: [-23.71, 18.51],  untabulated). However, 
when the IT specialist has distinct knowledge relative to the auditor, the auditor appears to be 
more affected by the presence of spatial distance, planning more hours (mean difference = 29.21, 
std. error difference = 9.509) when spatial distance is present (independent samples t-statistic = 
3.072, two-tailed p-value = 0.005, 95% CI: [9.74, 48.69], untabulated). Thus, the marginally 
statistically significant interaction suggests that the auditor’s extent scope decisions are most 
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Table 9: Extent Scope Decisions by Condition 
Panel A: Number of Budgeted Hours, Mean (Standard Deviation)
Panel B: ANOVA  Model of Number of Budgeted Hours
Type III SS df F -statistic p -value
Model 6428.710 3 2.913 0.042
Spatial Distance 3787.105 1 5.147 0.027
Domain Knowledge Distinctiveness 2.091 1 0.003 0.958
Spatial Distance × Domain Knowledge Dist. 2650.285 1 3.602 0.063
Error 41201.024 56
R² = 0.135; Adjusted R ² = 0.089
n = 31 n = 29 n = 60
Sources of Variation
The number of budgeted hours dependent variable is calculated as the total number of budgeted hours scheduled by the participant to 
be performed for the audit engagement in response to the IT specialist's control testing and risk assessment workpaper. 
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influenced by spatial distance when the IT specialist is socially dissimilar to the auditor in terms 
of domain knowledge.  
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7. DISCUSSION 
 Figure 12 provides a summary of the results of the tests of my hypotheses as well as 
references to the corresponding tables and figures. 
Hypotheses Theory - Effect Result Tests
H1: In the absence of spatial distance relative to the IT specialist, financial 
auditors place greater reliance on IT specialists possessing overlapping domain 
knowledge than IT specialists possessing distinct domain knowledge.
SIT - In-Group Bias Not Supported* Table 2
H2: Financial auditors rely more on spatially distant IT specialists within the 
firm than IT specialists that are not spatially distant.
SNT - Power of 
Weak Ties
Supported Table 2
H3: When the IT specialist is spatially distant relative to the financial auditor, 
financial auditors will rely more on the IT specialists possessing distinct domain 
knowledge than IT specialists possessing overlapping domain knowledge.
JAS - Preference for 
Dissimilar
Marginally 
Supported
Table 2
H4a: Financial auditors' assessments of competence will be higher for IT 
specialists possessing overlapping domain knowledge than for IT specialists 
possessing distinct domain knowledge.
Social Desirability 
Bias
Supported Table 3
H4b: Financial auditors' assessments of competence will not be positively 
associated with actual reliance on the IT specialist.
Social Desirability 
Bias
Supported Table 4
H5: Inconsistencies in financial auditor judgments of IT specialist competence 
and financial auditor reliance decisions will be suppressed by the extent of 
financial auditor identification with the IT specialist.
SIT - In-Group Bias Supported Figure 5
* Approaches marginal support with p -value = 0.1025. Lack of support likely due to small sample size and lack of power.
 
Figure 12: Summary of Results 
 
7.1 Financial Auditors’ Reliance on the IT Specialist 
The effect of the IT specialist’s domain knowledge distinctiveness on financial auditors’ 
reliance on the IT specialist depends on whether spatial distance between the IT specialist and 
financial auditor is present (different office location) or absent (same office location). With a 
small sample of auditor participants, I find a pattern of results supportive of H1, such that 
financial auditors rely on IT specialists that are in-house more when the IT specialist is socially 
similar in terms of domain knowledge (i.e., possesses overlapping domain knowledge instead of 
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distinct domain knowledge). Conversely, the pattern of results demonstrate that financial 
auditors rely on IT specialists that are outsourced more when the IT specialist is socially 
dissimilar in terms domain knowledge (i.e., possesses distinct domain knowledge instead of 
overlapping domain knowledge), supportive of H3. The pairwise comparison testing  H1 detects 
an effect that approaches marginal statistical significance, while the pairwise comparison testing 
H3 detects an effect that is marginally statistically significant. Failure to detect statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level is likely due to my small sample size and the resulting low power of 
my tests. Next, I discuss my findings in terms of the ANCOVA and pairwise comparisons, after 
which, I discuss my findings from the post-hoc comparisons conducted. 
According to my statistical tests, though approaching marginal significance, when IT 
specialists are brought onto the engagement from the same office, financial auditors, contrary to 
H1, do not appear to exhibit an in-group bias for IT specialists that have overlapping domain 
knowledge (i.e., a CPA designation) as reliance does not differ statistically significantly for 
CISA-CPA IT specialists compared to CISA-only IT specialists. Additionally, I find some 
evidence in support of the preference for the dissimilar hypothesized in H3 as auditors appear to 
rely on CISA-only IT specialists marginally more than CISA-CPA IT specialists when the IT 
specialist is outsourced from another office within the firm. 
Supporting H2, financial auditors exhibit a preference (bias) for the dissimilar in that they 
rely on IT specialists that are outsourced from another office within the firm more than in-house 
IT specialists. This “consultant effect” is driven by the differences in reliance between distinct 
domain knowledge IT specialists (i.e., CISAs) that are in-house versus outsourced from another 
office within the firm. However, there is no difference in the reliance on overlapping domain 
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knowledge IT specialists (i.e., CISA-CPAs) that are in-house versus those that are outsourced 
from another office within the firm.   
Taken together, my findings provide evidence toward a theory of social similarity in 
which social similarity in terms of domain knowledge attenuates the positive effects of social 
dissimilarity in terms of spatial distance. That is, overlapping domain knowledge eliminates the 
positive increase in reliance attributed to the presence of spatial distance. A theory of social 
similarity that allows for the interaction of different social similarity dimensions in affecting 
decision-making is more descriptive than the distinct theories used to motivate the three reliance 
hypotheses in my study. 
7.2 Financial Auditors’ Assessments of IT Specialist Competence 
 Financial auditors are expected to provide socially acceptable responses to judgment-
based questions about the IT specialist. Consistent with this notion, H4a predicts that financial 
auditors will assess the competence of IT specialists with overlapping domain knowledge as 
higher than the competence of IT specialists with distinct domain knowledge because those with 
overlapping domain knowledge have knowledge in an additional domain. My findings indicate 
that financial auditors do indeed assess the competence of IT specialists as higher when they 
possess both CISA and CPA designations relative to when they possess only a CISA designation. 
 Since social behavior often operates in a subconscious fashion (Greenwald and Banaji 
1995), financial auditors’ judgments about IT specialist competence are expected to be 
inconsistent with their reliance decisions. Consistent with H4b, financial auditors’ assessments of 
IT specialist competence are not positively related to their reliance behaviors. Results provide 
support for H5, which predicts that the inconsistencies between auditors’ judgments and 
behaviors are suppressed by the degree to which the financial auditor identifies with the IT 
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specialist. Specifically, when the financial auditor identifies more strongly with the IT specialist, 
the negative relation between competence judgments and reliance behaviors is attenuated 
because identification has a positive indirect effect on reliance. 
7.3 Other Financial Auditor Perceptions 
7.3.1 Perceptions of IT Specialist Credibility 
 While financial auditors do not assess credibility differentially for IT specialists varying 
in terms of domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance, the changes in credibility 
assessments from before completing the audit planning task and after being reminded of the 
domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance manipulations do differ. Specifically, an 
upward adjustment to IT specialist credibility assessments occurs when financial auditors are 
reminded that there is no spatial distance between the IT specialist and the financial auditor; 
however, no adjustment (upward or downward) to credibility assessments occurs when financial 
auditors are reminded that there is spatial distance between the IT specialist and financial 
auditor. Interestingly, this upward adjustment of credibility assessments for IT specialists that are 
more socially similar in terms of spatial distance suggests the presence of an in-group bias. 
7.3.2 Perceptions of the Cost of the IT Specialist 
 Financial auditors would be expected to perceive the cost of outsourced IT specialists to 
be higher than in-house IT specialists because of the added cost of bringing in the outsourced IT 
specialist (i.e., transport costs). Furthermore, an IT specialist with more than one professional 
designation should be considered more costly than an IT specialist with only one professional 
designation since the additional designation reflects additional knowledge. Counterintuitively, 
however, my findings indicate that financial auditors believe that IT specialists with a single 
professional designation are more costly than IT specialists with two professional designations.  
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7.3.3 Perceptions of CPA Profession Exclusivity 
 Measures of participants’ perceptions of the CPA profession were captured in order to 
ensure that my specific operationalization of overlapping domain knowledge as CISA-CPA was 
not driving results related to domain knowledge distinctiveness. In general, findings suggest that 
financial auditors believe the CPA profession to be highly exclusive. Perceptions of CPA 
profession exclusivity were not different across conditions and participants’ perception of CPA 
profession exclusivity was not a significant covariate in any of the statistical models in my study. 
Thus, perceptions of CPA profession exclusivity do not drive my results. 
7.3.4 Perceptions of Additional Designations Diluting Expertise 
 Measures of participants’ perceptions of the extent to which expertise/competence is 
diluted with additional professional designations were captured to ensure that my specific 
operationalization of domain knowledge distinctiveness as either a single professional 
designation or two professional designations was not driven by perceptions of dilution. There 
were no differences across conditions in terms of perceptions of dilution and participants’ 
perception of dilution was not a significant covariate in any of the statistical models in my study; 
thus, perceptions of dilution do not drive my results.  
In general, findings suggest that financial auditors disagree with the notion of additional 
professional designations diluting expertise. However, financial auditors appear to neither agree 
nor disagree with the ideas that additional professional designations reflect additional expertise 
or reflect no additional competence. Financial auditors’ belief that professional designations only 
reflect a small component of expertise may explain such neutral opinions about the added value 
of additional professional designations. 
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7.4 Financial Auditors’ Scope Decisions 
 Financial auditor reliance on the IT specialist is examined using participants’ planned 
quality budget hours as a proxy for actual reliance decisions. Quality budget hours are composed 
of several elements. In particular, audit planning scope decisions vary in terms of four 
components: nature, staffing, timing, and extent of procedures. My findings indicate that the 
nature, timing, and extent of planned audit procedures are impacted by one or both of the social 
similarity dimensions examined in my study. However, staffing decisions are unaffected by the 
social similarity dimensions examined in my study. 
7.4.1 Nature of Planned Audit Procedures 
 The nature of planned audit procedures is affected by the social similarity dimension of 
spatial distance. Specifically, when the IT specialist providing the control risk assessment is 
spatially distant, the financial auditor plans approximately one more audit procedure than when 
the IT specialist is not spatially distant. Thus, financial auditors plan more procedures in 
response to identical control risk assessments provided by IT specialists that are spatially distant 
as compared to IT specialists that are not spatially distant. Consistent with overall reliance 
decisions, this provides evidence of a “consultant effect” on the nature of planned audit 
procedures. 
7.4.2 Timing of Planned Audit Procedures 
 The timing of planned audit procedures is affected by the social similarity dimension of 
domain knowledge distinctiveness only when spatial distance is present. That is, when the IT 
specialist is outsourced from another firm office, the financial auditor budgets more year-end 
audit hours in response to the IT specialist with distinct domain knowledge (i.e., CISA) relative 
to the IT specialist with overlapping domain knowledge (i.e., CISA-CPA). Incidentally, there is 
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no difference in the timing of procedures planned in response to assessments of IT specialists 
that are socially similar to the financial auditor on one or both of the social similarity dimensions 
of domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance. However, financial auditors budget 
more hours to be performed at year-end when the IT specialist is socially dissimilar in terms of 
both domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance. 
7.4.3 Extent of Planned Audit Procedures 
 Finally, consistent with overall reliance results, the effect of spatial distance between the 
IT specialist and the financial auditor on the extent of planned procedures (i.e., budget hours) 
depends on the IT specialist’s domain knowledge distinctiveness relative to the financial auditor. 
While the extent of procedures is unaffected by spatial distance when the IT specialist possesses 
overlapping domain knowledge (i.e., CISA-CPA), the extent of procedures is greater in scope for 
IT specialists with distinct domain knowledge (i.e., CISA) when spatial distance is present (as 
opposed to absent). Thus, financial auditors budget the most hours in response to control risk 
assessments made by CISA IT specialists that are outsourced from another firm office and 
budget the least hours in response to control risk assessments made by in-house CISA IT 
specialists.  
Consistent with an in-group bias, when IT specialists are in-house, financial auditors 
budget more hours in response to the control risk assessments of the more socially similar CISA-
CPA IT specialists than less socially similar CISA IT specialists. The opposite is true for 
outsourced IT specialists, as financial auditors budget more hours in response to control risk 
assessments of CISA IT specialists than CISA-CPA IT specialists, indicating a preference for the 
dissimilar when spatial distance is present. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this study is to examine how the social similarity dimensions of domain-
knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance affect financial auditors’ reliance on specialists. 
Specifically, the setting of this study is one in which the financial auditor is relying on control 
testing and control risk assessments performed by an IT specialist for the purposes of audit 
planning. Examination of this setting is valuable due to the increased importance of the role of 
the IT specialist on most engagements. Given that ERP systems and complex accounting 
information systems have become prevalent throughout the business world, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for auditors to justify excluding IT specialists from the audit engagement 
team, especially considering AS No. 5’s increased focus on the audit of internal controls over 
financial reporting.   
Prior literature demonstrates that financial auditors are overconfident in their own 
abilities to assess risks in complex IT environments (Hunton et al. 2004). Many audits include IT 
specialists for the purpose of testing internal controls in complex IT environments. However, to 
the best of my knowledge no research, with one exception, has examined financial auditor 
reliance on IT specialists.
32
 Presumably, audit quality increases when auditors rely on the work 
of specialists; assuming, of course, that specialists are competent. It is for this reason that it is 
important to examine social similarity factors that may impact financial auditors’ reliance on IT 
                                                 
32
 The notable exception is Brazel and Agoglia (2007); however, Brazel and Agoglia (2007) focus on the impact of 
IT specialist competence on audit planning decisions related to the nature, staffing, timing, and extent of procedures. 
Their paper does not examine the effect of social similarity dimensions on the broader issue of overall reliance on 
the IT specialist. 
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specialists. Furthermore, this setting is unique in the sense that IT specialists, unlike many other 
types of specialists (e.g., valuation experts), work as members of the audit engagement team.  
One way that audit firms differ with respect to how they are organized has to do with the 
location of IT specialists across the firm. Conversations with managers at Big Four and national 
firms indicate that some firms maintain IT specialist personnel at most office locations, while 
others have IT specialist “hubs” where all IT specialists are housed for outsourcing to other 
offices as needed.  This difference in organizational structure may impact financial auditors’ 
reliance on IT specialists. The office location of the IT specialist relative to the financial auditor 
represents spatial distance, a construct that reflects high social similarity when it is absent (i.e., 
same office) and low social similarity when it is present (i.e., different office). 
Prior research indicates that financial auditors have concerns about IT specialist 
competence (Bagranoff and Vendrzyk 2000). As a result, it is important to examine a construct 
that has the potential to impact perceptions of IT specialist competence in a setting in which 
financial auditors rely on an IT specialist. In addition to the spatial distance between the IT 
specialist and the financial auditor, I examine the impact of the IT specialist’s professional 
designation(s) on financial auditors’ reliance on the IT specialist. Since professional designations 
reflect an individual’s domain knowledge, I examine how the domain knowledge distinctiveness 
of the IT specialist relative to the financial auditor impacts financial auditor reliance decisions. 
The more overlap there is in the domain knowledge of the IT specialist relative to the financial 
auditor, the more socially similar the two individuals are; however, the more distinct the domain 
knowledge, the less socially similar the IT specialist is compared to the financial auditor.   
Results from an experiment conducted on 60 financial auditors indicate that both domain 
knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance affect financial auditor’s reliance in terms of audit 
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planning decisions. When an IT specialist is outsourced from another office location, the 
financial auditor relies more heavily on the IT specialist’s control risk assessments. This can be 
interpreted as a “consultant effect,” in which IT specialists are a relied upon more because they 
are coming onto the engagement from elsewhere. This finding illustrates the power of weak ties 
in increasing reliance on specialists.  
While outsourcing IT specialists from other firm offices appears to result in higher 
reliance by financial auditors, professional designations play an important role as well. The 
aforementioned “consultant effect” appears to be driven by situations in which the IT specialist is 
already socially dissimilar relative to the financial auditor in terms of domain knowledge 
distinctiveness. Specifically, it is only when IT specialists possess a CISA designation, and not a 
CPA designation, that there is a difference in financial auditor reliance in terms of spatial 
distance.  
 Results indicate that the effect of the IT specialist’s social similarity in terms of domain 
knowledge distinctiveness on financial auditor reliance depends on the IT specialist’s social 
similarity in terms of spatial distance. This study does not find evidence of increased reliance on 
in-house IT specialists that are more socially similar in terms of domain knowledge (i.e., CISA-
CPA) relative to in-house IT specialists that are more socially dissimilar in terms of domain 
knowledge (i.e., CISA). However, despite this study’s small sample size, which diminished the 
power of the statistical tests used for hypotheses testing, results related to such an in-group bias 
approach marginal significance. Additional data collection is warranted to rule out Type II error. 
Results provide some evidence that when IT specialists are outsourced from another 
office within the firm, those that are socially dissimilar in terms of domain knowledge (i.e., 
CISA) are relied upon more by the financial auditor than IT specialists that are socially similar in 
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terms of domain knowledge (i.e., CISA-CPA). Contrary to the in-group bias predicted by social 
identity theory, this finding provides preliminary evidence of a preference for the socially 
dissimilar. 
Certain scope decisions of audit planning appear to play important roles in contributing to 
differences in overall financial auditor reliance on the IT specialist. While staffing scope 
decisions do not appear to be affected by the social similarity dimensions examined in this study, 
the nature, timing, and extent scope decisions of financial auditors do appear to be affected by 
one or both of the social similarity dimensions investigated in this study.  
The nature of planned audit procedures is affected by spatial distance such that financial 
auditors plan more procedures when the IT specialist is spatially distant than when the IT 
specialist is not spatially distant. Since financial auditors budget the most number of year-end (as 
opposed to interim) audit hours when the IT specialist possesses distinct domain knowledge and 
is spatially distant, the timing of procedures is shifted to year-end more when the IT specialist is 
socially dissimilar in terms of both domain knowledge and spatial distance than when the IT 
specialist is socially similar in terms of at least one of these two dimensions. Finally, financial 
auditors’ extent scope decisions are most similar to their overall reliance decisions in that the 
effect of domain knowledge distinctiveness on the number of hours budgeted depends on the 
spatial distance of the IT specialist. When the IT specialist is in-house, more hours are budgeted 
for IT specialists that have overlapping domain knowledge, consistent with an in-group bias or 
preference for the similar. Alternatively, when the IT specialist is outsourced from another firm 
office, more hours are budgeted for IT specialists possessing distinct domain knowledge, 
consistent with a preference for the dissimilar. 
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8.1 Implications 
 This study contributes to both research and practice. My findings indicate a boundary 
condition under which the well-established psychological theory of social identity does not hold. 
In particular, when specialists are outsourced from other offices, there appears to be some 
evidence of a preference for the socially dissimilar in terms of domain knowledge, or higher 
reliance on an individual with a unique professional designation, contrary to SIT. However, 
consistent with SIT, when specialists reside in the same office, there is evidence approaching 
marginal significance for a preference for the socially similar in terms of domain knowledge, or 
an individual with a shared professional designation. I propose that a broader theory of social 
similarity is more inclusive and descriptive of our socially complex world than social identity 
theory because dimensions of social similarity can interact, thereby generating different social 
biases that affect behaviors in distinctive ways not predictable by SIT.  
Although audit firms may have considered moving IT specialists to work alongside 
financial auditors within the same office to promote stronger relationships amongst these 
auditors, my findings indicate that reliance on the IT specialist is highest when the IT specialist 
is outsourced from another office and possesses a distinct CISA designation. My 
operationalization of spatial distance specifically tests reliance on IT specialists brought onto the 
engagement from another office in a situation in which all other in-house IT specialists are 
assigned to other engagements. This conservative operationalization of spatial distance would 
have biased against my finding results. Though I don’t examine a scenario in which IT 
specialists are brought onto engagements from specific IT specialist “hub” office locations as 
needed, I provide preliminary evidence that can inform audit firms about the potential 
incremental benefits of organizing IT specialists, and perhaps other specialists, in distinct offices 
from audit personnel.  
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Furthermore, while audit firms may have considered encouraging IT specialists to gain 
additional education (i.e., a CPA) in an effort to promote better communication and increase the 
strength of social ties with financial auditors, it appears that outsourced IT specialists possessing 
just one professional designation in the primary area of expertise (i.e., CISA) results in the 
highest reliance by financial auditors. Rather than encouraging IT specialists to acquire a CPA 
designation to improve financial auditor reliance on IT specialists, firms can focus their attention 
towards creating IT specialist offices that are distinct from offices that house financial audit 
personnel. It may behoove firms to have all their non-financial auditor risk assurance specialists 
at unique offices, as reliance on other risk assurance specialists may increase by way of the same 
organizational structure.  
8.2 Limitations 
 There are several limitations to be considered in interpreting the results of this study. 
First, my results are based on a small sample of 60 auditors. Due to the length of my experiment 
and the great difficulties involved in recruiting audit personnel for participation in my study, I 
am limited in terms of the power of my tests. While the statistically significant effects I detect in 
my study must be large in size given my small sample, I cannot be certain that my tests have the 
necessary power to detect other effects (i.e., H1 and H3) that are present.  
Second, the judgmental nature of the audit planning task used to capture actual financial 
auditor reliance decisions provides some constraints to normative prescriptions based on my 
results. Reliance comparisons across conditions in my study are relative to one another and not 
relative to some normative benchmark of optimal reliance. It is possible that the “consultant 
effect” documented in my study would result in audit efficiency problems (i.e., over-auditing).  
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 Third, the experimental nature of this study prevents me from incorporating all the rich 
information an auditor would encounter while involved in planning an actual audit. My 
manipulations of domain knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance were attempts at 
operationalizing social similarity; these manipulations may not adequately capture the power of 
social similarity as it exists in reality. One significant drawback in this respect is that the 
participants in my study did not socially interact with the IT specialist that provided control risk 
assessments. However, given that my manipulations of the domain knowledge distinctiveness 
and spatial distance dimensions of social similarity had effects on reliance, I would expect that 
real-world social interaction would result in even stronger effects than those documented here. 
 Fourth, my choice of the Houston office (relative to the Tampa office) to reflect the 
presence (absence) of spatial distance is also a limitation to my study. There may be a level of 
spatial distance in which SIT would continue to hold. For example, had I chosen the St. 
Petersburg office as the spatial distance present manipulation, financial auditors may have relied 
on the outsourced IT specialists differing in terms of domain knowledge consistent with SIT 
because St. Petersburg, though a different city from the Tampa office, forms part of the Tampa 
Bay region. Thus, my choice of the degree of spatial distance between the offices in my study 
may not generalize to other settings in which offices are closer in proximity. 
 Fifth, my study’s results, which are found in an auditing setting, are not necessarily 
generalizable to other non-auditing tasks in which an individual relies on an expert or specialist. 
The audit setting is a unique one in the sense that the audit firm serves a monitoring role for audit 
clients, with the ultimate goal of providing assurance to users of the audit clients’ financial 
statements. 
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 Lastly, my sample of participants, though randomly assigned across conditions, was not 
randomly selected from a population of all auditors. Given the unique nature of my spatial 
distance operationalization, I recruited from a broad cross-section of firms in the Tampa Bay 
region. Because the choice of region may have impaired the generalizability of results to auditors 
in other regions of the United States, I took great care in recruiting participants from all the Big 4 
firms as well as other national and regional firms.  
8.3 Future Research  
 There are ample opportunities for future research in this area. While my findings provide 
evidence that audit quality can be improved by way of audit effectiveness by outsourcing IT 
specialists (especially those possessing only the CISA designation), future research can examine 
the audit efficiency component of audit quality. For example, in lieu of examining increases in 
financial auditors’ planned audit procedures made in response to an IT specialist’s increased 
control risk assessment relative to a prior year, one can examine the decrease in financial 
auditors’ planned audit procedures in response to an IT specialist’s decreased control risk 
assessment relative to a prior year. In essence, to what degree will audit efficiency improve 
because of increased reliance on controls deemed more reliable (relative to the prior year) by the 
IT specialist?  
 Other opportunities for future research may include examining financial auditors’ 
reliance on other types of specialists. Although my study examines a setting involving financial 
auditors’ reliance on IT specialists, the audit setting is abound with many examples of specialists 
engaged to aid with the audit. Examples of specialists include valuation experts, actuaries, 
engineers, environmental consultants, geologists, tax specialists, and attorneys. Though my 
findings provide support for the interaction of the social similarity dimensions of domain 
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knowledge distinctiveness and spatial distance in affecting reliance on IT specialists, future 
studies should examine whether similar patterns hold in settings involving auditor reliance on 
other types of specialists.  
Finally, my study investigates how financial auditors rely on specialists that form part of 
the engagement team. However, some specialists have permanent positions within the firm, 
while others are outsourced from outside the firm. Consequently, it may be worthwhile to 
investigate other settings in which financial auditors rely on specialists that are not members of 
the audit firm’s personnel or not members of the audit engagement team. Auditors’ reliance on 
non-audit engagement team member specialists is a unique setting that should be investigated 
because the auditor should make additional assessments of these specialists’ competence, 
objectivity, and work performance when determining the degree of reliance. This is especially 
important in situations in which the specialist is engaged by management as opposed to the 
auditor. The area of auditor reliance on specialist provides fruitful avenues for future research.  
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Appendix A: Experimental Instrument 
1. Gender: 
 Male 
 Female 
 
2. Age : __________ 
3. In what city and state did you grow up? (If you grew up in another country, type NA)   
CITY: _________________ STATE: _________________ 
4. For which of the following audit firms do you currently work? 
 Big 4 Firm 
 National Firm (e.g., Grant Thornton, McGladrey, BDO, Crowe Horwath) 
 Regional Firm 
 Local/Small Firm 
 None of the Above (Please explain in the text box below.) ____________________ 
 
5. Please select which of the following best describes your position/role in the audit firm. 
 Staff auditor (staff assistant) 
 Senior 
 Manager 
 Senior manager 
 Partner 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 
6. How long have you been employed with your current audit firm? (Enter ‘0’ for none.) 
 
____Years 
 
____Months 
 
7. How long have you worked as an auditor in public accounting?   (Enter '0' for none.) 
 
____Years 
 
____Months 
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8. I currently possess the following professional certification(s): 
 CPA (Certified Public Accountant) 
 CA (Chartered Accountant) 
 CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor) 
 CFE (Certified Fraud Examiner) 
 CIA (Certified Internal Auditor) 
 CMA (Certified Management Accountant) 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 None 
 
9. Do you plan on pursuing any of the following professional certification(s) within the next two 
years? 
 CPA (Certified Public Accountant) 
 CA (Chartered Accountant) 
 CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor) 
 CFE (Certified Fraud Examiner) 
 CIA (Certified Internal Auditor) 
 CMA (Certified Management Accountant) 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 None 
 
10. Did you have a systems-related major or concentration in college (e.g., MIS major)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
11. Did you have a systems-related minor in college (e.g., IS minor)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
<PAGE BREAK> 
 
12. How much experience do you have performing tests of internal controls over financial 
reporting? (Enter '0' for none.) 
____Years 
____Months 
13. How much experience do you have planning further audit procedures on external audit 
engagements?   (Enter '0' for none.) 
 
____Years 
____Months 
<PAGE BREAK>  
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PINNACLE INC. CASE STUDY    
 
BACKGROUND    
 
Assume that you are the senior manager assigned to the 12/31/12 fiscal year-end audit of 
Pinnacle Inc. You have worked for the Tampa office of your firm for 7 years and acquired your 
CPA (Certified Public Accountant) designation after being with the firm for 3 years. Your firm 
has offices throughout the United States, with its national office (headquarters) in New York 
City.  
 
The audit team for the Pinnacle Inc. engagement consists of you (a senior manager), four staff 
auditors, a junior manager, an IT specialist, and a partner. Pinnacle Inc. is a publicly held, mid-
sized manufacturer of sporting goods equipment headquartered in Tampa, FL. It makes a variety 
of products for baseball, football, hockey, basketball, hunting, and fishing. Its products are sold 
across the U.S. to retailers of sporting goods equipment and also directly to customers via its 
Internet website. Your firm has audited Pinnacle Inc. for the last five years and past audits have 
always resulted in unqualified audit opinions. As in the prior year, the partner in-charge of the 
Pinnacle Inc. audit has set audit risk at a low level of 5%.  
 
The financial statements and materiality calculations for Pinnacle Inc. can be viewed by clicking 
the following link: Financial Statements and Materiality Calculations. Feel free to keep these 
materials open and refer to these items at any time.  
 
It is now October of 2012 and you are currently in the planning/internal control phase of the 
12/31/12 fiscal year-end audit.  
 
 
TASK OBJECTIVE  
 
Based on the information provided in this case, you will be asked to prepare audit programs 
and budgets for the current year’s (12/31/12) substantive tests of the Sales and Collection Cycle 
of Pinnacle Inc. It is important that you respond to questions in this case study as you normally 
would.     
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INSTRUCTION:  
Feel free to review the following background information. 
Pinnacle Inc. 
Balance Sheets 
(in thousands) 
 9/30/2012 12/31/2011 12/31/2010 
Assets (Unaudited) (Audited) (Audited)  
Current assets: 
 Cash and cash equivalents $   2,599 $   2,499 $   2,380 
 Accounts receivable, net of allowances for 
doubtful accounts of 305, 294, and 280, respectively 2,219 2,114 1,994 
 Inventory 81,097 76,507 73,564 
 Prepaid advertising 3,592 3,453 3,289 
 Other prepaid expenses 1,782 1,697 1,601 
 Deferred income tax benefits        4,055 3,825 3,678 
Total current assets $  95,343 $  90,095 $  86,506 
Property, plant, and equipment, at cost: 
 Land and buildings 33,267 31,987 30,464 
 Fixtures and equipment 36,122 34,402 32,455 
 Leasehold improvements           906 855 822 
Total property, plant, and equipment $  70,295 $  67,244 $  63,741 
 Less – accumulated depreciation       23,627 22,718 21,636 
Property, plant, and equipment, net $  46,669 $  44,527 $  42,105 
Intangibles, net       1,204 1,147 1,082 
Total assets $143,216 $135,768 $129,693 
Liabilities and shareholders’ equity 
Current liabilities: 
 Accounts payable $  27,441 $  25,769 $  24,370 
 Accrued liabilities 14,872 13,556 12,888 
 Short-term notes payable 4,076 3,554 3,289 
 Income taxes payable        5,205 4,596 4,241 
Total current liabilities $  51,594 $  47,476 $  44,788 
Deferred income taxes 2,667 2,516 2,337 
Long-term liabilities 190 182 173 
Shareholders’ equity: 
 Common stock, 17,773,000 shares issued 177 177 177 
 Additional paid-in capital 15,146 15,146 15,146 
 Retained earnings 109,818 104,588 99,527 
 Treasury stock (at cost)      (36,376) (34,317) (32,455) 
Total shareholders’ equity $  88,764  $  85,594 $  82,395 
Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $143,216 $135,768 $129,693 
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Pinnacle Inc. 
Materiality Calculations 
 
Materiality Calculations CURRENT YEAR 
(in thousands) 12/31/12 Audit 12/31/11 Audit 12/31/10 Audit 
Income Before Income Taxes 20,971  (a) 20,854 20,689 
 Multiply by 5% × 0.05 × 0.05 × 0.05 
Result: Planning Materiality 1,049 1,043 1,034 
 Multiply by 25% × 0.25 × 0.25 × 0.25 
Result: Tolerable Misstatement 262 261 259 
 
Note: Planning Materiality is the preliminary estimate of materiality made during initial 
planning. Monetary misstatement is the application of Planning Materiality at the individual 
account balance level.  
 
Estimate of 12/31/12 amount represents the 9/30/12 Income Before Income Taxes amount 
annualized (15,728/0.75 =20,971). 
 
<PAGE BREAK> 
103 
 
INSTRUCTION:  
Please review the following guidance for assessing risks and planning substantive 
procedures adapted from AS No. 8 (PCAOB 2010).  
 
AUDIT GUIDANCE: AS No. 8  
 
AS No. 8 provides the conceptual underpinning for the audit risk model. The auditor applies the 
audit risk model during the planning/internal control phase of the audit. Audit risk (AR) is the 
risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements 
are materially misstated. Audit risk is the product of the following interrelated factors:  
 
 Inherent Risk (IR) = the risk that a financial statement assertion is susceptible to a 
material misstatement, assuming there are no related controls.  
  
Control Risk (CR) = the risk that the entity’s internal control structure or procedures will 
not prevent or detect, in a timely manner, a material misstatement which could occur in a 
financial statement assertion.  
  
Detection Risk (DR) = the risk that the auditor will not detect a material misstatement 
that exists in a financial statement assertion.  
 
Mathematical Model: AR = IR x CR x DR, where AR, IR, CR, and DR are specified 
as percentages. 
 
DR has an inverse relationship with the scope of substantive testing procedures; thus, when DR 
decreases from one year to the next, the scope of planned substantive procedures can be 
increased. 
Holding everything else constant, when IR increases, the scope of planned substantive 
procedures is increased in response to the corresponding decrease in DR.     
 
Holding everything else constant, when CR increases, the scope of planned substantive 
procedures is increased in response to the corresponding decrease in DR.  
 
EXAMPLE:   
 
If control risk associated with the sales and collection cycle is assessed at a higher level in the 
current year in comparison to the prior year, all other things held constant, the auditor may 
consider increasing the number of accounts receivable confirmations tested in the current year 
over that of the prior year. As IR and CR increase, the auditor is expected to compensate with 
substantive procedures that are greater in scope to reduce DR. 
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PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING CAREFULLY.  
 
In the current year, you have assessed inherent risk at the same level as last year (35%).   
 
The IT specialist on the engagement team, D.J. Richards, is responsible for preparing the 
Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper.  
 
D.J. Richards is an IT specialist who has worked in your office (the Tampa office) of your 
firm for 6 years and has performed tests of controls on similar audit engagements in the past. D.J. 
Richards possesses the following professional designation, which he acquired after being with 
the firm for 3 years: 
 
 CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor) 
 
You are about to receive D.J. Richards’ completed workpaper documenting his control testing 
and related control risk assessments.    
 
INSTRUCTION:  
Please click on the following link: Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper. Keep this 
file OPEN throughout the study.   
 
Please read the workpaper you just opened.   
 
For ease of comparison, the workpaper includes information pertaining to: 
 Your tests of controls from last year (the initials “YOU” correspond to your initials)  
and  
 D.J. Richard’s tests of controls from this year (initials: “DJR”) 
 
<PAGE BREAK> 
If you accidentally closed the Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper and wish to 
see it again for the purpose of answering the following questions, please click on the following 
link: Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper. 
 
If you wish to refer back to the Financial Statements and Materiality Calculations, please click 
on the following link: Financial Statements and Materiality Calculations. 
 
INSTRUCTION:  
 
On the line below, please enter the 6-digit workpaper number located on the top right-hand 
side of the Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper.  
 
Workpaper Number: __________________ 
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MEMO Workpaper Number: 261985 
To:  YOU, CPA (Cert. Public Accountant), Tampa Office 
From:  DJR, CISA (Cert. Information Systems Auditor), Tampa Office 
 
Re:  Control Risk Assessment Workpaper 
 
Please find my workpaper documenting the control testing I performed and my related control risk assessments for 
the Sales and Collection Cycle below. 
 
 
Thank you, 
D.J. Richards 
D.J. Richards, CISA (Cert. Information Systems Auditor), Tampa Office  
Pinnacle Inc.: FYE 12/31/12
Preparer: YOU 10/15/2011 DJR 10/17/2012
Reviewer: LDM 10/22/2011
JSP 10/25/2011
Control Testing & Risk Assessment Workpaper
Sales and Collection Cycle
Audit Risk 5% 5%
Inherent Risk 35% 35%
Tolerable Misstatement $264,000 $261,000
Control Risk (CR) Assessment Scale
Low Moderate High
Risk Risk Risk
Controls Tested
Testing 
Result
Control 
Risk
Testing 
Result
Control 
Risk
Reliable 25% Reliable 23%
Reliable 29% Deficient 75%
Reliable 20% Reliable 18%
Reliable 25% Reliable 30%
Reliable 30% Reliable 28%
Reliable 35% Deficient 74%
Reliable 17% Reliable 20%
Reliable 37% Reliable 35%
Overall Control Risk Assessment for Sales & Collection Cycle: 30% 70%
1-2
8. Customer orders in excess of automatic computer 
authorized credit limits have signatures of credit 
management evidencing proper credit limit override.
Control risk assessments were based on current (prior) year testing of internal controls, which indicated 
that the client largely relies on adequate separation of duties and proper authorization of transactions to 
meet its control objectives.
2. System requires an approved sales order to produce 
a shipping document and system only bills for 
quantities shipped.
3. Unit selling prices match those contained in the price 
list master file of approved prices.
4. System automatically posts sales transactions to the 
accounts receivable subsidiary ledger & general ledger.
5. Entry of non-electronic customer orders is verified by 
another employee to ensure accurate order entry.
6. Sales order entry permissions are not assigned to the 
same roles as credit approval permissions by the 
application security administrator.
7. System compares customer order with customer's 
authorized credit limit and current account balance.
1. Passwords are used to ensure only authorized user 
access to the sales and collection applications.
 0%   10%   20%   30%   40%   50%   60%   70%   80%   90%   100%
2011 2012
Current YearPrior Year
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The following questions appeared only once the correct workpaper number was entered above. 
INSTRUCTION: 
Please circle your responses to the statements/questions below. 
 
1. In your opinion, the strength (i.e., effectiveness) of the control testing performed by D.J. 
Richards was probably: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Very         Very 
 Weak         Strong 
 
2. In your opinion, the accuracy of the control risk assessments made by D.J. Richards is 
probably:  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not         Very 
 Accurate         Accurate 
 
3. In your opinion, the reliability of the control testing and risk assessment workpaper prepared 
by D.J. Richards is probably:  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not         Very 
 Reliable         Reliable 
 
4. In your opinion, how credible is D.J. Richards as a source of control testing and control risk 
assessments?  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not         Very 
 Credible         Credible 
 at All 
 
5. In your opinion, how trustworthy is D.J. Richards with respect to the preparation of the 
Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpapers?  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at All         Very 
 Trustworthy         Trustworthy 
 
6. In your opinion, how would you rate D.J. Richards’ expertise in the following areas? 
 Low 
Level of 
Expertise 
    Moderate 
Level of 
Expertise 
    High 
Level of 
Expertise 
Information Technology 
Control Risk Assessment 
              
Financial Statement Auditing               
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If you accidentally closed the Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper that you will 
need for the purpose of planning the substantive procedures for the Sales and Accounts 
Receivable Audit Programs below, please click on the following link: Control Testing and Risk 
Assessment Workpaper. 
If you wish to refer back to the Financial Statements and Materiality Calculations, please 
click on the following link: Financial Statements and Materiality Calculations. 
If you wish to review the AS No. 8 guidance on using the Audit Risk Model for the purposes of 
making changes to the planned substantive procedures in the programs below, please click on the 
following: AS No. 8 Guidance. 
 
CURRENT YEAR WORKPAPERS: Sales & Accounts Receivable Audit Programs and 
Budgets 
INSTRUCTION:   
Recall that the partner has set AR (audit risk) at the same level as last year (5%) and your IR 
(inherent risk) assessment for this year is the same relative to last year (35%).  
Comparing D.J. Richard’s current CR (control risk) assessments to your CR assessments 
from last year, please complete the workpapers that follow.  
Below you will find information pertaining to the prior year audit procedures and budgets. For 
each procedure, respond as to whether you would like to  
 REPEAT (i.e., repeat procedure, performer, timing, AND budgeted hours for the current 
year),   
 DELETE (i.e., eliminate the procedure for the current year),   
 OR CHANGE (i.e., change the performer, timing, AND/OR budgeted hours of the 
procedure).  
You will also have the opportunity to input any customized procedures that you would like 
performed.  
Pinnacle Inc.: FYE 12/31/12   
12/31/12 Audit Program and Budget: SALES ACCOUNT 
 
Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
1. Compare sales to an expectation of sales 
(by product line). Roll-forward interim 
account balance to fiscal year-end. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Interim 16 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
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Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
2. Compare sales returns and allowances as a 
percentage of gross sales with previous years 
(by product-line). Roll-forward interim 
account balance to fiscal year-end. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Interim 5 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
 
Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
3. Compare bad-debts expense as a 
percentage of gross sales with previous 
years. Roll-forward interim account balance 
to fiscal year-end. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Interim 5 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
 
Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
4. Review sales journal and master file for 
unusual transactions and amounts. 
Staff Auditor Final 4 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
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Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
5. Select a sample of shipping documents 
and trace transactions to the sales journal. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Interim 6 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
 
Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
6. Perform sales cut-off testing by sampling 
sales transactions from the sales journal 
before and after fiscal year-end and tracing to 
sales invoice and bill of lading. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Final 5 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
 
Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
7. Select a sample of transactions from the 
sales journal, trace transaction to invoice, 
recompute extensions on sales invoices, and 
trace details on sales invoices to shipping 
documents and customer order. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Interim 6 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
  
110 
 
Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
8. Select a sample of transactions from the 
sales journal and trace transactions to the 
accounts receivable subsidiary ledger. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Interim 6 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
 
 
Are there any additional procedures for the audit program and budget for the SALES 
ACCOUNT that you would like to add for the current year? If YES, please input procedures 
below along with the performer, timing, and budgeted hours for each additional procedure. 
If NO, please continue on to the Accounts Receivable Audit Program. 
 
 
Additional Audit 
Procedures  
(if any) 
(Staff auditor,  
Senior, or  
Manager)    
Performed By 
(Interim: 9/30/12or  
Final: 12/31/12)    
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
9.     
10.     
11     
12     
13     
14     
15     
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Pinnacle Inc.: FYE 12/31/12   
12/31/12 Audit Program and Budget: Accounts Receivable 
 
Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
1. Select a sample from the accounts 
receivable subsidiary ledger, trace accounts to 
the accounts receivable trial balance, and 
obtain positive confirmation. Perform 
alternative procedures for non-responses. 
Roll-forward interim account balance to fiscal 
year-end. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Interim 18 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
 
 
Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
2. Obtain an ages list of receivables: select a 
sample of accounts and trace to the accounts 
receivable trial balance, foot trial balance, 
and trace to the general ledger. Investigate the 
collectability of account balances on aged list 
of receivables. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Interim 10 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
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Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
3. Obtain an analysis for the allowance for 
doubtful accounts and bad debt expense: test 
accuracy, examine authorization for write-
offs, and trace to general ledger. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Interim 6 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change  
Performed by:  
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12)  
Budgeted Hours  
 
Prior Year:  
Audit Procedure 
Performed 
By 
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
4. Review lists of balances for amounts due 
from related parties or employees, credit 
balances, unusual items, and notes receivable 
due after one year. 
Staff 
Auditor 
Final 6 
 
Current Year: 
Repeat, Delete, or Change 
 
Performed by: 
 
Timing (Interim: 9/30/12 or Final: 12/31/12) 
 
Budgeted Hours 
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Are there any additional procedures for the audit program and budget for ACCOUNTS 
RECEIVABLE that you would like to add for the current year? If YES, please input procedures 
below along with the performer, timing, and budgeted hours for each additional procedure. 
If NO, please click the “Continue” button at the bottom of the page. 
 
 
Additional Audit 
Procedures  
(if any) 
(Staff auditor,  
Senior, or  
Manager)    
Performed By 
(Interim: 9/30/12 or  
Final: 12/31/12)    
Timing 
Budgeted 
Hours 
5.     
6.     
7.     
8.     
9.     
10.     
11.     
 
<PAGE BREAK> 
 
Please close the “Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper” window.  
Do NOT close THIS window. 
 
 I have closed the window containing the “Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpaper.” 
 
<PAGE BREAK> 
 
Manipulation Check Questions 
 
1. D.J. Richards possesses the following professional designation(s): 
 Only a CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor) 
 Only a CPA (Certified Public Accountant) 
 Both a CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor) AND a CPA (Certified Public 
Accountant) 
 
2. D.J. Richards is an IT specialist from which office of your firm? 
 Tampa Office 
 Houston Office 
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
Thank you for preparing your current workpapers for Pinnacle Inc. Please complete the 
following questionnaire to finish the research project. Again, be assured that all of  your 
responses will be used for academic purposes only and will remain completely confidential. 
 
INSTRUCTION: 
Please indicate your responses to the following statements. 
 
1. The competence level of D.J. Richards was: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Very          Very 
 Low          High 
 
 
2. The strength of Pinnacle Inc.’s controls listed on the current year control testing workpaper 
for the sales and collection cycle were: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Very          Very 
 Weak          Strong 
 
 
3. The overall conclusion from the current year control testing workpaper prepared by D.J. 
Richards indicated controls were: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Very          Very 
 Unreliable          Reliable 
 
 
4. My confidence level in the audit plan and budget decisions I provided in the case is: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Very          Very 
 Low          High 
 
5. Relative to the average cost of employing a staff auditor, how costly do you believe it was to 
employ D.J. Richards to the engagement for the purpose of testing controls and performing 
control risk assessments? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Much Less     Equally     Much More 
 Costly     Costly     Costly 
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1. Based on the case materials and using the scale below, indicate your agreement with the 
statement below. 
 Not at 
All 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Very 
Much  
9 
As an 
engagement 
team member, 
I identify with 
D.J. Richards. 
                  
 
 
2. Based on the case materials and using the scale below, indicate your agreement with the 
statement below. 
 Not at 
All 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Very 
Much  
9 
It is important 
to me to work 
with someone 
like D.J. 
Richards on 
audit 
engagements. 
                  
 
 
3. Based on the case materials and using the scale below, indicate your agreement with the 
statement below. 
 
Not at 
All 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Very 
Much  
9 
As an 
engagement 
team member, 
I feel strong 
ties to D.J. 
Richards. 
                  
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1. When you were adjusting the audit plan and budget in response to D.J. Richard's control risk 
assessment workpaper, to what extent did the following factors affect your decisions? 
 
Not 
At All 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To a 
Great 
Extent 
8 
D.J. Richard’s 
Office Location: 
Tampa Office 
                
D.J. Richard’s 
Professional 
Designation: 
CISA (Certified 
Information 
Systems Auditor) 
                
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1. The financial statements of Pinnacle Inc. significantly affected my audit programs and 
budgets. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Disagree          Agree 
 
 
2. Had the financial statements of Pinnacle Inc. not been provided, my audit programs and 
budgets would have been very similar. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Disagree          Agree 
 
 
3. When arriving at an assessment of D.J. Richards’ competence, I rate the importance of his 
office location as: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Not          Very 
 Important          Important 
 
 
4. When arriving at an assessment of D.J. Richards' competence, I rate the importance of 
his professional designation(s) as: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Not          Very 
 Important          Important 
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Recall that D.J. Richards, an IT specialist from the Tampa Office of your firm, possesses the 
following professional designation(s): a CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor).         
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. In your opinion, the strength (i.e., effectiveness) of the control testing performed by D.J. 
Richards was probably: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Very         Very 
 Weak         Strong 
 
2. In your opinion, the accuracy of the control risk assessments made by D.J. Richards is 
probably:  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not         Very 
 Accurate         Accurate 
 
3. In your opinion, the reliability of the control testing and risk assessment workpaper prepared 
by D.J. Richards is probably:  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not         Very 
 Reliable         Reliable 
 
4. In your opinion, how credible is D.J. Richards as a source of control testing and control risk 
assessments?  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not         Very 
 Credible         Credible 
 at All 
 
5. In your opinion, how trustworthy is D.J. Richards with respect to the preparation of the 
Control Testing and Risk Assessment Workpapers?  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at All         Very 
 Trustworthy         Trustworthy 
6. In your opinion, how would you rate D.J. Richards’ expertise in the following areas? 
 Low 
Level of 
Expertise   
Moderate 
Level of 
Expertise   
High 
Level of 
Expertise 
Information Technology 
Control Risk Assessment 
              
Financial Statement Auditing               
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Imagine that you have recently been licensed as a CPA (Certified Public Accountant) after 
completing the 150 credit hour requirement as well as the 1 year full-time work experience 
requirement.   
 
Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Agree 
8 
The public accounting profession should 
make it easier for future applicants to obtain 
a CPA professional designation. 
 
                
The 150 credit hour education requirement 
ensures that members of the CPA profession 
possess the minimum knowledge 
necessary. 
 
                
The work experience requirement of 1 year 
of full-time work or 2 years of part-time 
work ensures that members of the CPA 
profession possess the minimum experience 
necessary. 
 
                
Members of the CPA profession form part of 
an exclusive group of individuals. 
 
                
Anyone should be permitted to become a 
member of the CPA profession. 
 
                
The CPA profession is a prestigious group 
of individuals. 
 
                
Individuals from other disciplines (besides 
accounting) should be permitted to become 
members of the CPA profession. 
 
                
Strict licensure requirements ensure that the 
public will continue to view members of the 
CPA profession as credible and 
trustworthy. 
                
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8. Consider a situation in which an individual possesses two professional designations: one in 
his/her field of expertise and one in an area outside his/her field of expertise.         
Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Agree 
8 
No one can be an expert in multiple fields. 
By having two professional designations, 
this individual is a "jack of all trades" and 
not an expert in his/her specialty field. 
                
The more professional designations a person 
has, the more intelligent and competent that 
individual is. By having two professional 
designations, this individual is an expert in 
multiple fields. 
                
A second professional designation does not 
have any meaningful effect on a person's 
competence. Having two professional 
designations in no way affects this 
individual's competence in his/her field of 
expertise. 
                
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1. What type of auditor would you describe yourself to be? 
 1  2  3  4  5  
 Financial        IT 
 Auditor        Auditor 
 
2. Based on your experience, to what extent do your engagements utilize IT specialists 
from other offices outside your office of the firm. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Not         To a Great 
 at All        Extent 
          
Question 3 appears if the prior question was answered as anything but 1. 
3. Based on your experience, what is the primary reason that an IT specialist from another 
office outside your office is utilized for engagements requiring an IT specialist? (select one) 
 Because all other IT specialists in my office are assigned to other engagements. 
 Because an IT specialist with a particular area of expertise (i.e., industry expertise) is needed. 
 Because my office does not have IT specialists on staff. 
 Other reason (please explain). ________________________________________ 
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4. Relative to other auditors at my firm, I have a higher level of expertise with accounting 
information systems. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Strongly         Strongly 
 Disagree        Agree 
 
 
5. My motivation level to complete this case study could be described as: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Very         Very 
 Low        High 
 
6. How difficult was this research experiment? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Very         Very 
 Difficult        Easy 
 
7. How realistic do you feel the case materials were? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Very         Very 
 Unrealistic        Realistic 
 
8. How attentive were you to the case materials while participating in this experiment? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Not at All         Very 
 Attentive        Attentive 
 
9. Do you have any comments about the experiment? 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
<END> 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables and Covariates 
Table A 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables and Covariates 
Spatial Distance:
Domain Knowledge: Distinct Overlapping Distinct Overlapping
n = 16 n = 15 n = 14 n = 15 n = 60
Planned Quality Budget Hours 173.06 210.73 262.29 199.87 210.00
(71.880) (133.880) (128.710) (77.507) (108.718)
Number of Planned Audit 11.56 11.47 12.00 12.87 11.97
   Procedures (Nature) (1.896) (1.685) (1.519) (2.326) (1.922)
Number of More Senior Staffed 3.00 2.67 3.57 3.67 3.22
   Procedures (Staffing) (3.864) (2.469) (2.593) (3.109) (3.031)
Number of Year-End Budgeted 45.81 49.87 72.36 49.93 54.05
   Hours (Timing) (23.654) (26.578) (49.039) (29.339) (33.922)
Number of Budgeted Hours 87.00 99.93 116.21 102.53 100.93
   (Extent) (19.779) (30.281) (31.665) (25.997) (28.413)
Audit Planning Experience 92.63 93.33 83.43 94.20 91.05
   (in months) (104.214) (104.495) (99.446) (105.669) (100.991)
Audit Firm Size 2.00 1.93 1.50 1.60 1.77
   (smaller values = larger firms) (0.966) (1.033) (0.650) (0.507) (0.831)
Auditor Type 1.06 1.20 1.286 1.47 1.25
   (1-Financial Aud. to 5-IT Aud.) (0.250) (0.414) (0.611) (0.834) (0.571)
Motivation 5.50 5.53 5.64 6.13 5.70
(1.932) (1.885) (1.499) (1.727) (1.750)
IT Specialist Competence 6.25 7.07 6.71 7.87 6.97
(2.017) (3.218) (2.555) (1.922) (2.484)
IT Specialist Expertise 4.75 4.67 4.86 5.13 4.85
   (in terms of IT CR assessments) (1.238) (1.799) (2.070) (1.187) (1.571)
Reliability of Controls 5.19 5.40 5.786 5.27 5.40
(1.797) (2.165) (2.455) (2.404) (2.164)
IT Specialist Credibility 5.68 6.04 6.200 6.973 6.21
   (pre-task) (1.836) (2.733) (2.103) (1.758) (2.138)
IT Specialist Credibility 6.20 6.68 6.03 7.17 6.52
   (post-experiment) (1.678) (2.482) (2.141) (1.864) (2.052)
IT Specialist Credibility 0.53 0.64 (0.17) 0.20 0.31
   (difference score) (1.256) (0.945) (0.592) (0.980) (1.008)
Identification with IT Specialist 4.19 4.84 5.21 4.71 4.72
(2.122) (1.479) (1.902) (1.690) (1.810)
CPA Profession Exclusivity 6.69 6.71 5.90 6.49 6.46
(1.177) (1.690) (1.349) (1.246) (1.379)
Variables
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Absent (In-House) Present (Outsourced)
Overall
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